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SUMMARY
European farmers provide a secure supply of safe food, manage the land and 
contribute to the wider rural economy. They have to cope with multiple risks 
such as often unpredictable and catastrophic weather conditions, the impact 
of political decisions and volatile international markets while delivering public 
goods such as a managed environment. They do this within the framework of 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Within the UK, agriculture is a 
devolved matter in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Price volatility is an inherent feature of agricultural commodities markets. We 
found that adverse effects at farm level are caused more by unanticipated periods 
of sustained low prices than by an increase in levels of volatility. Farmers can 
manage both by taking measures to increase levels of resilience.
Incremental changes to the CAP have resulted in farmers being more exposed to 
market forces. Direct income payments continue to provide a degree of financial 
stability, helping them to withstand protracted periods of low prices. We heard, 
however, that they can reduce incentives for innovation and efficiency gains.
We also investigated how public policy is used to support farmers in other major 
producer countries, in particular the United States, Canada and New Zealand. 
We found that there are fundamental differences between the organisation and 
structure of the agricultural sectors in the EU and those countries and believe 
that these differences render the models used by those countries unsuitable for 
general application in the EU. Lessons can be learned, however, from the US 
and Canadian approaches to insurance schemes, for example.
We believe that subsidised insurance schemes should not replace the current 
provision of direct income support through the CAP. They may, however, play a 
supplementary role in helping to counter the effects of extreme weather events. 
One-off support packages can also help to counter the impact of uncontrollable 
factors, but the UK Government should articulate the specific circumstances in 
which it will seek to access such funding at EU level.
We also see merit in the development of a range of financial instruments that can 
help farmers manage risk. We recommend that the European Commission and 
Member State governments work proactively with the financial sector to develop 
and promote more accessible and practical risk management tools. Government 
policy should ensure that farmers receive the training and education required to 
make use of these new instruments.
We were told that farmers needed to acquire the appropriate business skills, 
knowledge and expertise to calculate and manage their costs of production 
and overheads. We also heard about the merits of benchmarking. The UK 
Government should identify examples of best practice in the areas of knowledge 
exchange and dissemination and seek to promote them across the UK.
We were told that public funding may be keeping less progressive farmers 
in business at the expense of new entrants. We recommend that the UK 
Government works to identify the main barriers preventing farmers from exiting 
the sector, that they consider using Rural Development funding to accelerate the 
necessary structural change and that they create opportunities for new entrants 
into farming.
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Agriculture has a critical role in the provision of public goods, such as high 
animal welfare standards and environmental stewardship, and this role should 
be recognised in the policy and funding framework. We recommend that the 
European Commission consider restructuring the CAP based mainly around 
the provision of public goods, potentially removing the distinction between the 
two pillars currently governing Direct Payments on the one hand and Rural 
Development on the other.
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Responding to price volatility: 
creating a more resilient 
agricultural sector
ChAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The challenges facing EU agriculture
1. The agricultural industry provides jobs for 22 million people across the EU 
who are directly involved in farm work and for many more in related sectors. 
While a secure supply of safe food is the industry’s most visible output, 
farmers also play an important role in the management of the land and the 
environment as well as in the wider rural economy.
2. Farms across the EU vary enormously in size and type, from family 
smallholdings to large commercial agribusinesses. Developing and 
implementing a common policy to meet the different needs of all farmers 
presents a serious challenge. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
launched in 1962, is the main framework within which EU agriculture is 
managed. The CAP has undergone incremental change since its inception 
and, over time, has reduced support provided through prices in favour of 
support unrelated to production decisions. As a consequence, many farmers 
are now more exposed to market prices and therefore price volatility.
3. The effects of price volatility are felt differently by different farming sectors 
and by farms of different sizes. The presence of support under the CAP for 
certain sectors can also affect levels of resilience, with some less supported 
sectors even emerging as more resilient than those with a history of substantial 
support. Price volatility can be an opportunity for some farmers, but for 
others it can severely affect their livelihoods.
4. In the face of pressure on their incomes, many farmers have turned to 
diversification to supplement their income and reduce their risk exposure, 
but not all are able to do so.
5. The capital intensive and long term nature of farming limits the sector’s 
ability to respond quickly to sudden market disruption caused by, for 
example, extreme weather events or unpredictable political decisions.
6. Against a backdrop of reports of an ongoing crisis in UK agriculture1, the 
Committee undertook an inquiry to examine the extent to which price 
volatility was increasing and how agricultural resilience to withstand price 
and other shocks could be strengthened.
7. As a global phenomenon, price volatility is here to stay, and is beyond the 
control of the individual farmers who feel its effects. Their best defence is to 
draw upon a range of mitigation measures to improve their resilience, and 
we have examined various options available in the EU and elsewhere in the 
world. We have also offered some thoughts on the future of the CAP.
1 ‘UK farming faces two more years of pain says Carr’s boss’, Daily Telegraph (11 April 2016): http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/04/11/uk-farming-faces-two-more-years-of-pain-says-carrs-
boss/ [accessed 5 May 2016]
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The case for public intervention
8. Over the course of our inquiry, it became clear to us that public intervention 
in the agricultural sector is justified where it can be seen explicitly to support 
the provision of public goods, such as increased food security, high food 
safety standards, animal welfare standards, stewardship of the land and a 
contribution to a well-functioning rural economy.
9. On stewardship, the CAP recognises that much of the EU’s agricultural 
land has to be conserved and farmed in a sustainable manner. We expect 
farmers to manage hedgerows, woodlands, watercourses and footpaths as 
well as promoting biodiversity where appropriate, all of which have direct 
costs and can reduce profitability. We should rightly speak of farmers as 
‘land managers’, and the concept of ‘natural capital’ should inform policy 
making. Public funds should support this work where it is already taking 
place and encourage it where it is not.
10. Global agriculture faces increasing challenges, including climate change. 
Extreme weather events are on the rise, while demand for available land is 
increasing. Productivity and efficiency are of the utmost importance if food 
production and environmental goals are to be secured in the face of global 
warming, and public policy should be mindful of the need to adapt to a 
constantly changing world.
11. Developing economies are increasing the competition for food, and it makes 
sense to focus on productivity and efficiency at both farm and industry 
level. In our 2014 report, Counting the Cost of Food Waste: EU Food Waste 
Prevention2, we argued that levels of food waste in the EU were unacceptably 
high. Approximately one third of the food produced in the world for human 
consumption every year—around 1.3 billion tonnes—is lost or wasted.3 The 
positive effects of advances in agricultural efficiency and productivity will 
always be undermined if produce is needlessly wasted at any point, from 
farmer to processor, from retailer to consumer.
12. Although we do not examine the distinct role of retailers in this report, it is 
important to acknowledge that co-operation throughout the entire supply 
chain can bolster agricultural resilience. Longer term contracts can provide 
stability, but problems arise when retailers use the contracts with their 
suppliers for their own advantage, sometimes cancelling orders with little 
notice or compensation. This remains an ongoing cause for concern.
13. The ongoing reform of the CAP provides an opportunity to shape future 
behaviour in agriculture. A revised CAP should be significantly less complex 
and should focus on public goods, natural capital and the creation of a more 
resilient sector.
14. Above all, we were conscious that our work should have a particular focus 
on the role of those at the centre of agriculture: farmers. They should be at 
the heart of any changes in public policy and developments in agricultural 
practice. The potential of UK agriculture is significant, and farmers should be 
willing to explore new techniques, acquire new skills and share best practice. 
2 European Union Committee, Counting the Cost of Food Waste: EU Food Waste Prevention (10th Report, 
Session 2013–14, HL Paper 154)
3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on Food 
Loss and Waste Reduction’: http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/ [accessed 5 May 
2016]
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Willingness to benchmark in order to understand the cost of production is 
key to enhancing farmers’ competitiveness.
The inquiry and the Committee’s work
15. We issued our Call for Evidence in October 2015 and took oral evidence 
from a range of witnesses, from the UK and beyond, between December 
2015 and February 2016. We received 29 pieces of written evidence and 
took oral evidence from 22 witnesses, over 7 evidence sessions. In March 
we visited farms in Hampshire and Berkshire to talk with farmers about the 
evidence we had received and to gather their views on future public policy 
options. We would like to thank all who were involved in that visit for their 
candid comments and willingness to engage with our work.
16. This report is aimed at the UK Government, which is responsible for 
implementing much of the CAP, and which supplements EU policy with 
domestic measures to support agriculture. The UK Government must 
develop a unified approach to agriculture and the environment. We heard 
with interest that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) is working on a 25 year plan for food and farming, and on a separate 25 
year plan for the environment. We are concerned that dividing the two policy 
areas in this way does not demonstrate awareness of the interconnectedness 
of agriculture and the environment, or of the value of natural capital. We 
await the publication of the plans in the near future.
17. Our report is also aimed at the European Commission, who are tasked with 
initiating ongoing CAP reform and keeping current policies under review. 
We hope that the voice and experience of national parliaments will inform 
any preparatory work for the next round of CAP reform.
18. On 23 June 2016 the people of the United Kingdom will decide whether the 
country should remain in or leave the European Union. We have not, in this 
report, explored either the options for an alternative UK agricultural policy, 
were the electorate to vote to leave, or the process whereby the UK would 
negotiate exit from the CAP and the wider process of policy transition. We 
trust that the conclusions and recommendations contained in this report will 
be of value whatever the result of the EU referendum.
19. The members of the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee who 
carried out the inquiry are listed in Appendix 1; and their declared interests 
are also listed. We are grateful for the written and oral evidence that was 
submitted to the inquiry; the witnesses are shown in Appendix 2. We are 
also grateful to Professor Berkeley Hill and Dr Dylan Bradley, who acted as 
Specialist Advisers to the inquiry.
20. The Call for Evidence is given in Appendix 3. All evidence is published 
online.
21. We make this report to the House for debate.
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ChAPTER 2: PRICE VOLATILITY
Defining price volatility
22. Price volatility in the agricultural sector is generally understood to mean 
excessive variations in agricultural commodity prices over time. It refers 
specifically to price fluctuations, upwards and downwards, around 
an expected level. According to Tim Lloyd, Professor of Economics, 
Bournemouth University, “volatility will include some high prices and some 
low prices, but it is distinct from the state of high prices or low prices.”4
23. A number of witnesses, including Defra,5 David Gardner, the Chief Executive 
of the Royal Agricultural Society of England,6 and Jared Greenville, Senior 
Agriculture Policy Analyst at the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD),7 pointed out that price volatility is an intrinsic 
feature of markets, including agricultural ones, as prices adjust to changing 
circumstances. Agricultural markets tend to exhibit high levels of volatility 
for a number of reasons, as explained in a report for the G20 by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the OECD and 
others8:
(a) Agricultural production is vulnerable to natural disasters, such as 
bad weather and pests, as well as to policy changes and international 
incidents, such as the 2014 Russian embargo on imports of a range of 
agricultural products from the EU.
(b) The inelastic nature of demand and supply of the market, particularly 
in the short term, means that a large change in prices is required to 
balance supply and demand after a shock.
(c) There is a lag in the supply response to price changes as the agricultural 
sector requires a considerable time to make changes to production, 
which can cause cyclical adjustments that add an extra degree of 
volatility to the markets.
24. Defra agreed that while demand for agricultural commodities tends to be 
steady, supply depends on natural factors including seasonality and weather.9
25. Professor Tim Lloyd, Steve McCorriston, Professor of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Exeter; and Wyn Morgan, Professor of Economics, 
University of Sheffield, argued that agricultural markets are additionally 
prone to occasional spikes, such as those that took place in food markets 
in 2007–2008 and 2011. They noted, though, that farmers are sometimes 
able to benefit from this phenomenon.10 These spikes can be clearly seen in 
Figure 1 below, which demonstrates price movements in UK price indices 
for selected agricultural products.
4 Q 2
5 Written evidence from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (RPV0009)
6 Q 30
7 Q 52
8 FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 
Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2 June 2011): https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
9 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
10 Written evidence from Professor Tim Lloyd, Professor Steve McCorriston, and Professor Wyn Morgan 
(RPV0029)
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Figure 1: Real indexed prices for selected agricultural commodities (UK)
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26. Figure 2 demonstrates price movements for all agricultural outputs with 
respect to the long-term average price. It also shows the extent of annual 
percentage changes in the price index.
Figure 2: Real indexed prices for all agricultural outputs (UK)
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10 PRICE VOLATILITY AND AGRICULTURAL RESILIENCE
27. Professor Lloyd noted that there were different ways of measuring price 
volatility. The most common measure is the ‘coefficient of variation’, which 
measures variation of price relative to its average value over some sample 
period.11
28. There appeared to be no consensus, however, over what constitutes excessive 
volatility. The report for the G20 by the FAO, the OECD and others argued 
that the answer depends on individual or national circumstances, with small, 
resource-limited farmers being particularly vulnerable to a fall in prices:
“Suffice it to say that volatility becomes an issue for concern and for 
possible policy response when it induces risk averse behaviour that leads 
to inefficient investment decisions and when it creates problems that are 
beyond the capacity of producers, consumers or nations to cope”.12
29. Price volatility is an inherent feature of agricultural markets, and it 
will remain a normal risk to be managed by farmers as part of their 
business strategies.
A historical perspective
30. Recent years have seen a more volatile period in agricultural commodity 
prices. The evidence, however, suggests that this current episode is not an 
anomaly, and that volatile periods have generally been followed by periods of 
more stable prices.
31. According to the Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets report, 
“there is little or no evidence that volatility in international agricultural 
commodity prices, as measured using standard statistical measures is 
increasing in the long term.” Nevertheless, it noted that volatility had 
been higher during the decade after 2000 than the previous two decades.13 
Professor Lloyd, Professor McCorriston, and Professor Morgan agreed that, 
despite the price spikes of 2007–2008 and 2011, research did not point to 
any general increase in the volatility of prices on world agricultural markets.14
32. Professor Lloyd said:
“Volatility tends to cluster in periods of time and in between each cluster 
of volatility there is relative stability. If we look at the recent burst of 
volatility compared to the previous 10 years, which was a relatively 
stable period, volatility has increased. However, if we go further back 
and include the 1970s, which was a much more volatile period than we 
have just been through, we can see the positive trend that we might 
observe over a short period of time disappears.”15
33. Domestic price variations may differ from those seen in international 
markets depending on how integrated domestic markets are with global 
11 Q 2
12 FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 
Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2 June 2011): https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
13 FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 
Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2 June 2011): https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
14 Written evidence from Professor Tim Lloyd, Professor Steve McCorriston, and Professor Wyn Morgan 
(RPV0029)
15 Q 3
STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 00:01 MONDAY 16 MAY 2016  
This document is issued in advance by the House of Lords on the strict understanding that no publicity may be given to the text 
of the report before the above time and date.
11PRICE VOLATILITY AND AGRICULTURAL RESILIENCE
prices. Defra used the development of EU dairy market prices to make this 
point. It argued that the EU milk market was relatively shielded from the 
world market until 2006 due to import tariffs and the milk quota, with prices 
hovering above the EU support price. After the liberalisation of the market 
and the relaxation of the quota, EU milk prices had “begun to align with the 
more volatile world milk price”.16
34. Indeed, the Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets report argued 
that trade measures such as import duties, export taxes, non-tariff barriers 
or domestic policies, such as price support, “all influence the extent to which 
price changes in domestic markets mirror those on international markets”.17
35. Despite increased volatility in agricultural prices in recent years, we 
conclude that the overall level of price volatility is no higher than at 
other times in the past.
Factors influencing volatility
36. The drivers of price volatility can be numerous and affect both demand and 
supply. They range from extreme weather events disrupting agricultural 
production to countries’ trade policy responses. Dr Philip Dawson, Reader 
in Agricultural Economics, Newcastle University, Professor Lloyd, Professor 
McCorriston and Professor Morgan, provided a helpful summary of the 
main drivers for recent price spikes.18 Their evidence is summarised in Box 1.
Box 1: Drivers of recent price spikes
• Weather shocks in supplying countries
• Declining stocks
• Low investment
• Trade policy responses of exporting and importing countries
• Increasing demand for biofuels
• Rising demand by emerging nations, especially India and China
• Financialisation of agricultural commodity markets
• High oil/fertiliser prices
Sources: Written evidence from Dr Phil Dawson (RPV0007), Written evidence from Professor Tim Lloyd, 
Professor Steve McCorriston and Professor Wyn Morgan (RPV0029)
37. Dr Phil Dawson told us that “Explanations of higher future price volatility 
include low stocks, increasing speculation, and the current financial crisis. 
There is no consensus about the relative weights of each explanation.”19
38. Exchange rate fluctuations also influence price volatility. Defra noted that 
a strong pound made imports to the UK market cheaper, depressing UK 
prices.
16 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
17 FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 
Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2 June 2011): https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
18 Written evidence from Dr Phil Dawson (RPV0007) and written evidence from Professor Tim Lloyd, 
Professor Steve McCorriston, and Professor Wyn Morgan (RPV0029)
19 Written evidence from Dr Phil Dawson (RPV0007)
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39. Professors Lloyd, McCorriston and Morgan noted that storage played an 
important role in mitigating the impact of price spikes. When stocks of 
commodities were adequate, they smoothed out changes in supply or demand 
in agricultural markets. Inadequate stocks, however, would exacerbate the 
situation and lead to more marked price variability.20
40. Moreover, the perishability of agricultural produce contributes to levels of 
price volatility in various commodities. Professor Lloyd argued:
“We tend to observe, other things remaining equal, very high volatility 
in fruits, simply because they are perishable products that we cannot 
store. Wheat, on the other hand, is storable and its volatility tends to be 
less than others.”21
41. Export subsidies to farm products were also highlighted as a source of price 
volatility on world markets. His Excellency the Rt Hon Sir Lockwood Smith, 
the High Commissioner of New Zealand to the United Kingdom, commended 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) commitment in December 2015 to 
abolish such subsidies, arguing that it had “helped to lead to normal market 
mechanisms having greater impact on stabilising prices”.22 Defra agreed that 
“the EU’s move away from the use of export subsidies also contributes to the 
stability of world markets.”23
42. In the EU, the evolution of the CAP from commodity price support towards 
decoupled income support and environmental payments has increasingly 
exposed EU farmers to market prices. According to Defra, “greater market 
orientation in the EU farming sector can improve efficiency and productivity, 
but also bring more exposure to price volatility on international markets.”24 
The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB), the 
statutory levy board, concurred:
“Historically, when many of today’s farming businesses were in their 
infancy, the CAP provided much of the price risk management required 
meaning the business could focus purely on optimising the physical 
attributes.”25
Why does volatility matter?
43. While variations in prices provide important market signals to steer farmers’ 
production and investment decisions, excessive price volatility caused by 
transient influences can undermine the economic validity of these signals. 
For instance, farmers face the risk of losing their productive investments 
made in times of high prices if prices subsequently drop significantly. This 
uncertainty may lead to sub-optimal investment decisions.
44. In addition, periods of low prices pose significant problems for farm incomes. 
The House of Commons’ Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s 
recent report on Farmgate prices, which investigated farm gate prices for dairy, 
20 Written evidence from Professor Tim Lloyd, Professor Steve McCorriston, and Professor Wyn Morgan 
(RPV0029)
21 Q 3
22 Q 57
23 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
24 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
25 Written evidence from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) (RPV0020)
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lamb and pork industries in the UK, found that the most recent period had 
seen prices fall, leading to many farmers suffering financial difficulty.26
45. The AHDB noted that farmers tended to struggle with adjusting to low 
prices:
“Essentially, many businesses still take a very physical rather than a 
business approach to periods of low prices. This prevents the business 
from identifying and responding to market signals—for example it is 
often said that dairy farmers will ‘milk through’ low prices to maintain 
short-term cash flow—rather than making and taking more challenging 
business decisions.”27
46. Both price volatility and low prices present challenges for farmers. 
In our opinion, adverse effects at farm level are caused more by 
unanticipated periods of sustained low prices than by an increase in 
levels of price volatility.
Normal vs. excessive volatility
47. The OECD argued that producers should be facing some price volatility as 
part of “normal business risks that they undertake”. Such limited volatility 
provided signals to make appropriate investments into the sector, guided by 
supply and demand:
“A certain amount of risk should be present in the industry, so when we 
think about price volatility we should really only be thinking in terms of 
where governments start to … play a role in helping to overcome these 
catastrophic and extreme events.”28
48. Sir John Marsh, Emeritus Professor at the University of Reading, gave an 
example of “the traditional pig cycle, where a period of high prices would 
lead to excessive investment and a subsequent market crash”. He argued 
that such behaviour would misdirect real resources and increase the cost of 
technical innovation. Excessive volatility could also have social consequences 
by pushing marginal producers out of business, which might lead to 
consequences such as a gradual depopulation of regions.29
49. The Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets report argued that:
“Not all price variations are problematic, such as when prices move along 
a smooth and well-established trend reflecting market fundamentals 
or when they exhibit a typical and well known seasonal pattern. But 
variations in prices become problematic when they are large and cannot 
be anticipated and, as a result, create a level of uncertainty which 
increases risks for producers, traders, consumers and governments and 
may lead to sub-optimal decisions.”30
26 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Farmgate prices (Third Report, Session 2015–16, 
HC474)
27 Written evidence from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) (RPV0020)
28 Q 52
29 Written evidence from Sir John Marsh (RPV0006)
30 FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 
Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2 June 2011): https://www.oecd.org/
tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
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50. Some witnesses stressed the potential benefits that farmers could derive from 
price volatility. Paul Wilson, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Nottingham, noted that the temporary high prices which resulted from 
the volatility experienced in 2007–08 was a positive event for cereal farmers, 
allowing them to reinvest in depreciating assets. He concluded that farmers 
were able to make a profit on the upswing of prices, and that it was only the 
downswing that presented a problem.31
51. Philip Bicknell from the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), said: “When we 
saw higher prices, we saw investment in plant and machinery, perhaps stuff 
that has a shorter lifespan.” He added, however, that investment in farm 
buildings and storage needed to maintain an appropriate level of capital stock 
might not materialise because volatility made longer term forward planning 
difficult.32
The impact of speculation
52. The evidence on the impact of speculation on price volatility was 
inconclusive. According to Dr Dawson, limiting speculation on agricultural 
futures markets “may lead to increasing volatility, may mitigate against the 
important roles of traders who provide liquidity and absorb risk, and may 
drive funds into international futures markets that have fewer regulations”.33
53. On the other hand, Professor Morgan argued that some speculation in 
the futures market was “a response to volatility, not necessarily the cause, 
although it could reinforce some of the volatility”.34
54. A 2010 report for the OECD found that increased participation of index 
fund investments in agricultural commodity markets had not increased price 
volatility in agricultural futures markets: “There is no statistically significant 
relationship indicating that changes in index and swap fund positions have 
increased market volatility.”35
Volatility as a driver of productivity
55. Price volatility can also drive productivity gains on farms, as farmers 
adopt strategies to improve their resilience to unexpected price swings and 
protracted periods of low prices. The New Zealand High Commissioner, 
for example, reported “staggering” productivity improvements in New 
Zealand’s agricultural sector after the removal of subsidies that had shielded 
farmers from global market forces.36 Other witnesses cautioned that there 
were particular circumstances in New Zealand, which they felt played an 
important role in the changes that took place, such as currency devaluation.37
56. Indeed, many witnesses argued that free trade could have a stabilising 
influence on prices, while protectionist measures were considered 
counterproductive. Defra noted that policies such as import bans aimed at 
31 Q 14
32 Q 14
33 Written evidence from Dr Philip Dawson (RPV0007)
34 Q 3
35 Irwin, S. H. and D. R. Sanders (2010), The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on Commodity Futures 
Markets: Preliminary Results, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, No. 27, OECD 
Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/45534528.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
36 Q 53
37 Q 16 (Philip Bicknell), Q 43, Q 79
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shielding the domestic market from price rises could “export instability onto 
the world market”.38
57. Douglas D. Hedley, former Assistant Deputy Minister in Agriculture and 
Agri-food of Canada, argued that volatility in commodity prices was not a 
concern, as long as “open and fair trade rules and non-distorting domestic 
programs are in place.” He added that “a considerable degree of volatility 
in prices stems from governmental action in both trade distortions and 
distorting domestic programs”. As an example, he noted that China’s decision 
to alter its state purchases of feed grains, dairy products and meats, had “a 
considerable effect on the recent declines in prices for these commodities”.39
58. The evidence we received suggested that farmers being prepared for price 
variations of both inputs and outputs and periods of low prices, would assist 
farmers in making decisions on investment and business strategies. Such 
preparedness would not, however, eliminate the risk arising from unexpected 
price movements. Managing this risk is complicated by, in particular, the 
time lag between the decision to produce and the time when marketable 
output is generated and revenue realised. Dr Dawson argued:
“Higher volatility (and therefore higher price risk) may lead farmers, 
traders, input supply firms and food processors to implement better 
financial management strategies which include the use of futures and 
options, insurance, storage, and diversification or collaboration to share 
costs.”40
59. A degree of price volatility sends crucial market signals, which inform 
production and investment decisions. It also provides incentives for 
innovation and efficiency gains.
60. Preparedness for price movements will assist farmers in their 
investment and business decisions, but it will not eliminate risk.
61. Public policy should not aim to control prices but to help farmers develop 
resilience mechanisms to manage the risks posed by volatility.
Input prices
62. Though price volatility, as we have used the term, refers to farm gate prices 
paid to producers, variations in input costs, such as fertilisers, seeds, animal 
feed and energy, are also affected by price variations. These may be different 
from variations in output prices. As an important component of production 
costs, they affect farm incomes and profitability and can either mitigate of 
exacerbate the impact of output price volatility.
Impact on different farm groups
63. The EU agricultural sector is very diverse, involving a wide range of 
farm types from intensive to conventional and organic, and various types 
of produce from livestock, to grain and horticulture. Farmers also face 
different conditions, with additional payments available to those farming in 
designated ‘areas with natural constraints’, where agricultural production is 
more difficult due to factors such as soil, slope and climate.
38 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
39 Written evidence from Douglas D. Hedley (RPV0033)
40 Written evidence from Dr Philip Dawson (RPV0007)
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64. The impacts of price volatility differ depending on the type of farm, the 
ownership and the age of the farmer. Young farmers and tenant farmers 
are likely to face specific challenges. Young farmers may be particularly 
vulnerable to price volatility, because they often lack the financial resources 
required as a buffer during periods of low prices. Difficulty in accessing 
credit is compounded by the difficulty that many young farmers face in 
securing land ownership.
65. The OECD outlined the challenge for young farmers, explaining that “what 
[they] would be particularly vulnerable to are the shocks where they do not 
have the financial reserves to deal with it”. They were consequently more 
likely to exit the market “if they enter at the wrong time and there is a sudden 
shock”.41 Sir Peter Kendall, Chairman of the AHDB, agreed that young 
farmers were less resilient, as they might lack land ownership or reserves in 
the bank.42
66. According to Lynsey Martin from the National Federation of Young 
Farmers’ Clubs, access to finance is a major concern for young farmers when 
they have limited capital or a limited credit record: “Without a secure form 
of contract for whatever you are producing, whether it is arable or livestock, 
young farmers find it very difficult to get some sort of finance.”. She added 
that because few young farmers can entertain any prospect of land ownership 
in the current financial climate, innovative ways of farming, such as share 
farming or joint business ventures, could help them get into the industry.43
67. Other witnesses argued that young farmers had an advantage, because they 
were more capable of adapting to changing circumstances and possessed 
different and more contemporary skillsets, giving them resilience in the face 
of shocks. For instance, the European Commission’s Directorate General 
for Agriculture (DG AGRI) argued that young farmers were more educated 
and more open to new technologies than the rest of the farming community:
“Young farmers tend to be better trained … [The] latest research 
confirms that, indeed, young farmers are more eager than the rest to 
develop all entrepreneurial and managerial skills such as marketing, 
financial, communication, networking and management skills. These 
skills are essential to guarantee the long-term viability of their farms and 
cope with the economic challenges that [they] will face in the future.”44
68. The AHDB told us that young farmers could help older ones adapt to 
available technology:
“The training that is now being given in agricultural colleges is equipping 
them to understand the markets as well as the technology that will play a 
fundamental part in our being competitive in the future.”45
The Royal Agricultural Society of England agreed about the value of work 
done in the colleges, and added that there was an opportunity to work more 
41 Q 61
42 Q 32
43 Q 24
44 Written evidence from the European Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture (DG AGRI) 
(RPV0027)
45 Q 32
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closely with young farmers’ clubs, to turn them into a vehicle to help “upskill 
people coming into the industry”.46
69. Some of the challenges facing tenant farmers are similar to those that young 
farmers grapple with, including access to finance and a lack of land ownership. 
Tenants have the additional burden of paying rent: Professor Wilson noted 
that higher prices tended to drive rents up, but told us that when prices 
moved to a downward path, some tenants would be paying relatively higher 
rents than was the case historically.47
70. George Dunn, from the Tenant Farmers Association, said that fixed rents 
and the expense involved in renegotiating tenancy contracts were a major 
concern for farmers operating in a volatile market. He added that, compared 
to farmers who own their land, tenant farmers were more constrained when 
trying to diversify by combining farming with other economic activities to 
develop resilience.48
71. Mr Dunn added that tenant farmers did not have access to the capital value 
of the land, and that this could become a problem when they needed to 
borrow to sustain themselves through a volatile period, particularly when 
prices were low.49
72. Mr Dunn also flagged up the length of tenancies as an issue:
“For people who are on farm business tenancies—we call them the new 
style of tenancies, but they have been around … since 1995—a big issue 
in managing volatility is that they are incredibly short in length. The 
average length of term is just over three years. In a volatile market, that 
gives you no time at all to have the ability to manage the highs with the 
lows.”50
73. Oliver McEntyre, National Agriculture Strategy Director, Barclays 
Agriculture, identified short tenancies as a potential barrier to obtaining the 
credit needed to make long term investments:
“If we have only a five-year tenancy or an eight-year tenancy, that is all 
we can look to lend money over. We will lend money into agriculture for 
25 years, and even up to 30 in some instances, but if we have only an 
eight-year tenancy it is not very responsible to lend someone money over 
15 years because, after eight years, that business could cease to exist.”51
46 Q 32
47 Q 13
48 Q 24
49 Q 24
50 Q 24
51 Q 67
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Table 1: Changes to farm tenancy agreements
Full Agricultural Tenancy Farm Business Tenancy
Legislation
Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 
(AHA 1986)
Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995 
(ATA 1995)
Effective date of origin
All new tenancies starting before 1 
September 1995 and some starting 
after in accordance with the 
provisions of ATA 1995.
All new tenancies starting from 1 
September 1995, bar exemptions set 
out in the Act
Security
Normally lifetime of tenant. 
Tenancies starting before 12 July 1984 
may have rights of succession.
Determined in the agreement with 
average now below 4 years in practice.
Notice
Most notices to quit require tribunal 
consent, but the landlord has the 
ability, in specific circumstances to 
serve incontestable notices to quit 
for reasons including non-payment 
of rent, bad husbandry or death of 
the tenant. Notice to quit on death of 
tenant is stopped by an application for 
succession.
Tenancies of two years and less 
will come to an end automatically. 
Tenancies of more than two years 
must be ended by either party serving 
notice to quit corresponding with 
the termination date of the tenancy. 
The minimum notice period is 12 
months. The agreement may also 
include a break clause for either side 
to terminate the tenancy early.
Rent reviews
The landlord or tenant has the right 
to a rent review 3 years after either 
the start of a tenancy or a previous 
rent review. The act contains a 
“rent formula” which takes into 
consideration the earning capacity of 
the farm.
Landlords and tenants can negotiate 
their own rent levels and decide 
whether they want to have rent 
reviews. Any rent formula used must 
not preclude a reduction. In the 
absence of contractual provisions, 
either the landlord or the tenant can 
demand a rent review every 3 years.
Sources: Tenant Farmers Association; UK Government
74. There was, however, no consensus over whether volatility affected some 
farming sectors more than others. Ross Murray, President of the Country 
Land and Business Association (CLA), argued that all sectors were currently 
vulnerable to volatility, with no particular sector more affected than others. 
What would be more interesting, he argued, would be to differentiate 
between farms with good or bad management within sectors, farm types 
and tenure types.52
75. The NFU, on the other hand, saw differences across sectors, some of which 
related to the tools that different farm types had at their disposal to manage 
volatility. He suggested that the dairy and red meat sectors, for example, did 
52 Q 13
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not have the options available to the pig and poultry sectors (such as feed 
price ratchets) or cereals (such as futures prices).53
76. Price volatility may also affect different regions to a different degree. In 
the case of the devolved administrations, Professor Wilson noted that such 
regional differences “come down to the farm types that are typically operating 
in those areas”. He added that there were still significant differences in the 
way the CAP was implemented in the different regions, potentially creating 
an uneven playing field. In Scotland, for example, some subsidies were still 
linked to production in the beef and sheep sectors, providing support which 
other sectors did not enjoy.54
77. Various sub-groups of farmers experience volatility to different 
degrees and therefore require different strategies and support to 
strengthen their resilience. We recommend that the UK Government 
encourages tenant farmers seeking to diversify and strengthen their 
resilience. The UK Government and the devolved administrations 
should also investigate the impact of short-term tenancies on the 
ability of farmers to make necessary investments.
53 Q 13
54 Q 15
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ChAPTER 3: RESILIENCE AND ThE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
78. This chapter looks at how farmers have traditionally sought to improve their 
levels of resilience. We outline the current options available under the CAP 
and put these in the context of how the Policy has evolved.
Types of risk facing farmers
79. Defra noted that farmers “face many risks manifesting as volatility in 
agricultural markets”, and that such risks differed in their probability and 
impact, implying different potential roles for the UK Government and 
farmers.55
80. According to the OECD different levels of intervention were required in 
different circumstances. Normal variations in production, prices and weather 
could be managed directly by farmers as part of their normal business 
strategy and did not require a specific policy response. At the other end 
of the spectrum, infrequent but catastrophic events affecting many farmers 
over a wide area, such as severe droughts or the outbreak and spread of 
a damaging disease, were usually beyond farmers’ and markets’ capacity 
to cope, and might mandate a government response. Finally, marketable 
risks lying between the normal and catastrophic, such as hail damage and 
some variations in market prices, could be handled through market tools or 
through cooperative arrangements among farmers.56
81. In addition, as has already been mentioned, climate change is expected to 
increasingly exacerbate the risk of weather shocks and changing production 
conditions in the agricultural sector. According to the European Commission, 
the EU farming sector will be in the frontline, coping with impacts such as 
changes in rainfall patterns and rising temperatures, as well as more frequent 
extreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts, storms and floods.57
Defining resilience
82. Witnesses agreed that resilience encompassed the capacity of the agricultural 
sector to withstand the impacts of price volatility and low prices, and the 
ability to maintain competitiveness. Ian Hodge, Professor of Rural Economy 
at the University of Cambridge noted that resilience relied:
“on a series of different types of capital: financial reserves that can be 
drawn on when incomes are low, levels of machinery and other assets 
that give capacity to cope with unfavourable production conditions, 
human capital that provides knowledge and skills to understand and 
address changing and unfamiliar circumstances, natural capital that 
provides ecosystems services in support of production, and social capital 
that provides access to social networks and support for information and 
sharing resources”.58
55 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
56 OECD, Risk Management in Agriculture: What Role for Governments? (November 2011). https://www.
oecd.org/agriculture/agricultural-policies/49003833.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
57  European Commission, EU Agriculture and Climate Change factsheet (September 2015): http://ec.europa.
eu/agriculture/climate-change/factsheet_en.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
58 Written evidence from Professor Ian Hodge (RPV0016)
STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 00:01 MONDAY 16 MAY 2016  
This document is issued in advance by the House of Lords on the strict understanding that no publicity may be given to the text 
of the report before the above time and date.
21PRICE VOLATILITY AND AGRICULTURAL RESILIENCE
83. Menter a Busnes, which implements Farming Connect, a Welsh advisory 
service for farming families and forestry businesses operated under the 
Welsh Rural Development Plan, stressed the link between resilience and 
competitiveness. It argued that both of these were associated with well-run 
businesses with improved levels of income and productivity, which were 
therefore better able to manage risk.59
84. According to Farm Europe, a think-tank focusing on EU rural economies, 
“A resilient agricultural sector is one which can respond to risk effectively 
and take steps to mitigate the wider effects of global price volatility.”60
The Common Agricultural Policy as a source of support
85. EU countries’ agricultural sectors are regulated by the CAP, which to a large 
extent provides the policy framework within which farmers manage risk. DG 
AGRI told us that EU agricultural policy had shifted “from strong market 
management with high support prices towards a flexible system consisting 
of direct payments [including the Basic Payment Scheme] complemented by 
a market safety net”. This set it apart as a “comprehensive tool to meet the 
challenge of market volatility in the short, medium and long term”.61
The evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy
86. The CAP is one of the oldest EU policies, having been launched in 1962 
following the establishment of the European Economic Community. This 
necessitated transferring national state intervention—a prominent feature in 
the agricultural sectors of the founding member countries, but incompatible 
with the principle of free movement of goods—to the Community level.62
87. According to the European Commission, the policy was developed in the 
post-war years when agriculture in Western Europe had been crippled. It 
aimed to encourage better productivity in the food chain, thereby ensuring 
a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, stabilise the market 
and ensure the availability of food supplies to EU consumers at reasonable 
prices.63
88. At the point of its inception, the CAP offered high support prices to 
farmers, combined with border protection and export support to incentivise 
production. By the 1980s, however, the EU had permanent surpluses in many 
of the major farm commodities. The high budgetary cost of the measures 
and the distortion of some world markets led to the introduction of the milk 
quota in 1984, and a maximum ceiling for the CAP budget in 1988, as part 
of efforts to reform the policy without departing from its basic principles.64
89. The 1992 reform of the CAP started the shift from production support 
through market intervention (price support and border tariffs) towards what 
59 Written evidence from Menter a Busnes (RPV0030)
60 Written evidence from Farm Europe (RPV0015)
61 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
62 European Parliament, The common agricultural policy (CAP) and the Treaty, Fact Sheets on the 
European Union (January 2016) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.
html?ftuId=FTU_5.2.1.html [accessed 5 May 2016]
63 European Commission, The early years: establishment of the CAP (22 April 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/cap-history/early-years/index_en.htm# [accessed 5 May 2016]
64 European Commission, The crisis years II: the 1980s (22 April 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
cap-history/crisis-years-1980s/index_en.htm [accessed 5 May 2016]
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has become seen as income support. It introduced Direct Payments65 to 
farmers to compensate for the cut in price support.66 Subsequent reforms 
further de-coupled support payments from production, increased market 
orientation and included environmental requirements and reinforced support 
for rural development.67
90. The latest round of reform, covering the period 2014–2020, has continued 
along the same path, introducing the ‘green payment’ as a new policy 
instrument. This subjects 30% of Member State total Direct Payments to 
environmentally beneficial greening practices, such as the maintenance of 
permanent grassland, ecological focus areas and crop diversification.68
Increased market exposure
91. The evidence strongly suggested that the developments in the CAP from 
supporting production by intervention in markets towards providing direct 
forms of income support had exposed EU farmers to the dynamics of global 
agricultural commodity markets.
92. According to Defra, “the intensity of market intervention has declined 
significantly as a result of CAP reform” since the early 1990s, leaving EU 
markets more open to respond to fluctuations of supply and demand”.69
93. The AHDB told us that this greater exposure to global volatility presented 
increased challenges to farmers:
“De-regulation of the EU Agricultural markets has meant that farmers 
have to now actively manage their own price risk … Clearly this is a 
huge challenge for the industry, which requires a broader and new set of 
management skills, beyond the traditional physical skills.”70
94. Changes to the framework of the CAP have resulted in a greater 
exposure of production decisions to market forces. Direct Payments, 
however, provide income support which maintains a degree of 
financial stability for some farmers.
Market management tools
95. Despite the decline in market intervention, Defra pointed out that the EU 
still retained a number of market management tools, including intervention 
buying, emergency powers to address “serious market disturbance”, a crisis 
reserve, and a facility for export subsidies.71
65 Direct payments now comprise the Basic Payment Scheme, the Green Payment, the Small Farmers’ 
Scheme and the Voluntary Coupled Scheme. The term “Direct Payments” is used in this report to 
refer to this suite of schemes and those that preceded them (the Single Farm Payment).
66 European Commission, The 1992 reform (“MacSharry reform”) (22 April 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/cap-history/1992-reform/index_en.htm [accessed 5 May 2016]
67 European Commission, Overview of CAP Reform 2014–2020, Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief, 
No (5 December 2013): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2016]
68 European Commission, Overview of CAP Reform 2014–2020, Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief, 
No (5 December 2013): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2016]
69 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
70 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
71 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
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96. As an example of an emergency measure, DG AGRI noted a temporary 
exceptional aid to milk producers in the Baltic countries and Finland which 
it introduced in the wake of the August 2014 Russian import embargo on 
most EU agricultural products.72
97. Defra also pointed to the €500 million package of measures announced by 
the Commission in September 2015, to “support European farmers after a 
prolonged period of low prices”.73 The largest part of the package consisted 
of targeted aid for all Member States to support the dairy sector. Additionally 
it advanced certain Rural Development payments and included plans to 
address market imbalance, including the extension of private storage aid.74
98. According to DG AGRI, market measures are now deployed only as a last 
resort, at times when market conditions become adverse and prices collapse: 
“Thus the policy has gradually shifted from the concept of a safety net based 
on targeting price signals towards one targeting farm income, and the recent 
measures in support of the dairy sector reflect this.75
99. It also stressed that a policy delivered through price support, as was previously 
the practice in the EU, would lead to a vicious cycle: such support effectively 
increases prices, providing incentives for overproduction, which again leads 
to collapsing prices, and eventually to demands for volume controls. It 
concluded: “This recipe may temporarily work for small or isolated countries, 
but it fails to stabilise income in more open economies.”76
100. The shift in the CAP towards income support and greening is likely 
to continue. Future policy decisions must focus on addressing the 
outcomes of price volatility and periods of prolonged low prices 
and help farmers to develop resilience mechanisms rather than 
controlling prices.
101. While we note the Commission’s ambition to simplify the CAP, the 
focus must be on reducing complexity for the farmers who use it.
The 2015 aid package
102. The Welsh and Northern Irish administrations welcomed the September 
2015 package but argued that much more needed to be done to address the 
acute situation in the dairy sector. According to the Welsh Government, “EU 
Aid packages of this type do help but they are by no means the panacea.”77 
The Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Agriculture and Rural 
Development agreed that “much more is needed to assist farmers with the 
cash-flow difficulties they are experiencing [following a] sustained and sharp 
drop in milk prices”.78
103. There was, though, a difference of view over the usefulness of such emergency 
responses. The Welsh Government argued: “The dairy sector faces many 
challenges and a one-off relatively modest payment will only have a limited 
72 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
73 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
74 European Commission, Annex: Comprehensive package of measures, Fact Sheet (7 September 2015): 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5601_en.htm [accessed 5 May 2016]
75 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
76 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
77 Written evidence from the Welsh Government (RPV0010)
78 Written evidence from Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(RPV0002)
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impact and could well entrench further attitudes within the industry that the 
Government will ‘bail us out’.” Instead, the focus should be on helping farm 
businesses and the industry become stronger so that they can cope with such 
challenges without government intervention.79
104. By contrast, the Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Agriculture and 
Rural Development stated that farmers “need immediate assistance now 
or they will go out of business”. It added that the actions geared towards 
stabilising markets and addressing the functioning of the supply chain were 
focused on aiding recovery in the medium to long term.80
105. George Eustice MP, Minister for Farming, Food and Marine Environment, 
also noted that Member States could use the CAP’s Rural Development 
funding to “help farmers get back on their feet” after a natural disaster. This 
provision allowed Member States to grant farmers aid to restore agricultural 
production potential damaged by natural disasters, adverse climatic and 
other catastrophic events and to invest in preventive measures.81 The Minister 
told us that the UK Government used the funding to support farmers after 
floods in the Somerset Levels in 2014.82
106. One-off support packages can help to counter the impact of extreme 
natural disasters or catastrophic events that are beyond individual 
farmers’ control. Policy should, however, focus on building the 
sector’s resilience in the longer term.
107. We recommend that the UK Government clearly articulate the 
specific circumstances under which it will seek to access EU funding 
to provide emergency aid for farmers in the wake of an extreme 
natural disaster or a catastrophic event.
The Risk Management Toolkit
108. The latest round of CAP reform also introduced a new Risk Management 
Toolkit, which allows Member States to use Pillar 283 funding for Rural 
Development to finance three different types of risk management instruments:
(a) financial contributions to premiums for crop, animal and plant 
insurance against economic losses to farmers caused by adverse climatic 
events, animal or plant diseases, pest infestation, or an environmental 
incident;
(b) contributions to mutual funds to pay financial compensation to 
farmers, for losses caused by adverse climatic events or by the outbreak 
of an animal or plant disease or pest infestation or an environmental 
incident;
79 Written evidence from the Welsh Government (RPV0010)
80 Written evidence from Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(RPV0002)
81 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013
82 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013
83 Pillar 2 refers to rural development policy, while Pillar 1 encompasses product and producer support. 
Pillar 1 is funded solely from the EU budget, while Pillar 2 is based on multi-annual programmes that 
require co-financing from Member States.
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(c) an income stabilisation tool, in the form of financial contributions to 
mutual funds, providing compensation to farmers for a severe drop in 
their income.84
109. Some witnesses pointed out that the new risk management options under the 
CAP had so far not been very popular among Member States. According to 
DG AGRI, the uptake of the EU risk management tools in the programming 
period 2014–2020 had been “rather limited”. They told us that in some 
cases, Member States’ reluctance to include such instruments in their Rural 
Development Programmes (RDPs) appeared to be caused by a “cultural 
shift to more sector involvement in managing risks”.85
110. Defra added that some Member States had preferred to use national funds 
under the EU’s state aid rules to provide support for insurance, and were 
concerned about the potential expense of the income stabilisation tool in 
comparison with the size of their RDPs.86
Increasing farmers’ responsibility
111. According to DG AGRI, these new options encouraged farmers to “share 
responsibility in managing specific on-farm risks”.87 Indeed, some witnesses 
argued that farmers should take on greater responsibility for managing risk. 
The OECD said that producers were best placed to manage day-to-day 
business risks, while the EU and governments should target support towards 
more extreme, catastrophic risks.88
112. The NFU agreed that individual farmers should contribute to their own risk 
management, for example, by undertaking benchmarking comparisons of 
their costs with comparable businesses, or by considering ways to buy and 
sell inputs and outputs. It added:
“Farmers should have access to a range of measures to help them to 
manage volatility. These measures should be accessible and easily 
understood. There is a role for government to ensure this is the case.”89
113. DG AGRI noted that risks that were specific to certain countries or regions 
should be left to Member States to manage, including weather and diseases:
“How to address risk at the EU level should depend on the type of risk 
that is EU-wide, such as market risks (linked to the Common Market, 
with its internal and external dimensions) or broader environmental 
risks (with the best example being the impact from climate change).”90
We return to this issue in Chapter 7.
The role of Direct Payments
114. Direct Payments under Pillar 1 of the CAP provide a major source of income 
to some farmers. The evidence suggested that this income, while protecting 
these farmers during periods of low prices, could undermine the industry’s 
competitiveness and resilience in the longer term.
84 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013
85 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
86 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
87 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
88 Q 62
89 Written evidence from the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) (RPV0024)
90 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
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Direct Payments as a risk management tool
115. The NFU argued that Direct Payments provided an “effective risk 
management function”, complementing measures such as intervention and 
private storage aid. It also expressed concern that developing alternative risk 
management tools financed by the CAP would reduce the Direct Payments 
budget, consequently undermining the existing policy.
116. The AHDB said that Direct Payments were likely to contribute to resilience, 
but it highlighted the need for farmers to acquire the skills and tools needed 
in the market. It argued that the payments provided “passive volatility 
management”, while options such as insurance schemes could be used to 
manage volatility more actively.91
117. DG AGRI also noted that the switch towards Direct Payments allowed a 
“clear transmission of market signals”, which it said was a key element for 
the competitiveness of the agricultural sector.92
Direct Payments stifling innovation
118. Some witnesses, on the other hand, told us that Direct Payments reduced 
incentives to innovate and might artificially keep ineffective or unproductive 
farmers in business.
119. The Welsh Government noted that while income support provided a safety 
net for farm businesses, it might also be the reason why farm businesses 
“innovate and embrace change more slowly than they might otherwise do”—
such a direct subsidy might stop individual businesses and the wider industry 
from addressing current challenges and realising a long term vision.93
120. Nick Tapp, a farmer, agreed that the current policy was delaying the pace 
of change to meet new demands from the marketplace, “with the result that 
inefficiency is rewarded, and technical innovation can be ignored”. 94
121. Professor Ian Hodge noted the important role of shocks in bringing about 
changes in the agricultural sector:
“When there are major shocks or stresses, as has occurred periodically 
in the past, it may require more radical changes in agricultural 
systems and structures that the existing population of farmers or the 
current structure of farm businesses is unwilling or unable to deliver. 
The restriction on this more radical adjustment option might have a 
substantial opportunity cost to society in preventing a shift towards 
more socially valuable enterprises or techniques. “95
He added that some businesses might resist changes “that could be beneficial 
at a more aggregate level” if they were committed to a particular production 
type or technology:
91 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
92 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
93 Written evidence from the Welsh Government (RPV0010)
94 Written evidence from Nick Tapp (RPV0005)
95 Written evidence from Professor Ian Hodge (RPV0016)
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“In this context, the only way in which the industry can change more 
radically would be through a change in the population of businesses, 
some leaving the industry and new ones joining.”96
122. We also heard evidence suggesting that sectors that did not benefit from 
Direct Payments might be better prepared to operate in competitive markets. 
Barclays Agriculture and Allan Wilkinson, Head of Agriculture and Food at 
HSBC, noted that the pig and poultry sectors, along with the horticulture 
sector, were ahead of other sectors in terms of having the business knowledge 
and recording systems to understand their production costs.97 It is certainly 
the case that Direct Payments offer farmers a guaranteed income regardless 
of their actions to improve resilience.
123. Rural Business Research noted that the Direct Payment accounted for 
56.4%, or £22,400, of the Farm Business Income (FBI) that English farmers 
achieved on average for the 2014/15 financial year. Only 5.3% (£2,100) 
was generated from agriculture and 23.4% (£9,300) from diversification, 
according to data from the English Farm Business Survey.98 It should be 
noted, however, that the Farm Business Survey only covers farms deemed 
to be ‘commercial’ and excludes the smaller businesses that make up half of 
UK farms99. In addition, while FBI can be equated with financial net profit, 
it is calculated using differing methods.100
124. Direct Payments provide farmers with important income support 
to withstand protracted periods of low prices. They can, however, 
reduce incentives for innovation and efficiency gains and hold back 
much needed structural change.
125. In the long term Direct Payments have a crucial role in supporting the 
provision of public goods. This is discussed in the context of the future shape 
of the CAP in Chapter 7.
Voluntary co-operation and diversification
126. Within the framework of the CAP, farmers have traditionally adopted 
strategies actively to increase the viability of their businesses, including 
through voluntary co-operation and diversification.
127. Sir John Marsh noted that farmers could co-operate among themselves, 
or with major customers or suppliers in the form of vertical coordination, 
potentially leading to vertical integration.101 Similarly, Menter a Busnes 
argued that farmers’ competitiveness could be increased by measures such 
as collaborative buying of inputs, which could have a significant impact on 
income. It added that cooperation could increase the negotiating power of 
farmers, who were traditionally perceived as price-takers whose production 
decisions did not affect the market price.102
96 Written evidence from Professor Ian Hodge (RPV0016)
97 Q 72
98 Written evidence from Rural Business Research (RPV0008)
99 Farm Business Survey, ‘User Guide’: http://farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/DataBuilder/Default.aspx? 
module=UGRepresentation [accessed 5 May 2016]
100 Farm Business Survey, ‘User Guide’: http://farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/DataBuilder/Default.aspx? 
module=UGCostCentresAllocationTo [accessed 5 May 2016]
101 Written evidence from Sir John Marsh (RPV0006)
102 Written evidence from Menter a Busnes (RPV0030)
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128. The evidence suggested that other common risk management strategies 
employed by farmers include informal “self-insurance” through saving and 
borrowing,103 and increasing storage capacity to allow flexibility in deciding 
when to sell commodities.104
129. Farmers have also sought to reduce their exposure to risk through their 
choice and mix of farming enterprises (choosing combinations that contrast 
in ways such as vulnerability to weather shocks), by maintaining a degree 
of production flexibility, and by diversification. On-farm diversification 
involves farmers undertaking other income-generating farm activities, such 
as tourism and farm based retailing. In contrast, off-farm diversification 
involves farmers or other members of their families diversifying their incomes 
by taking up employment or business opportunities outside the farm.
130. Rural Business Research, a research consortium led by the University of 
Nottingham, noted:
“Although farms have typically become more specialised over time with 
respect to their agricultural activities, farmers have also engaged with 
additional income generating activities, including diversifying their 
business activities drawing on a range of farm and non-farm resources 
(including value-added to farm produce via on-farm retail, recreation 
activities drawing on land resources, accommodation provision, 
including tourism and agricultural contracting).”105
131. They added that renewable energy generation, using technologies such as 
solar, wind and anaerobic digestion, had more recently become a key on-
farm diversification activity. Nevertheless, investment requirements and 
planning controls were significant barriers to large-scale renewable energy 
projects.106
132. Professor Morgan noted that the diversification of production helped 
farmers spread the risk by producing many different commodities rather 
than just having a monoculture.107 The All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Agroecology for Sustainable Food and Farming agreed: “The diversification 
of outputs means that a fall in the price of one agricultural commodity will 
have less overall effect on the farm business.”108
133. Some witnesses noted, though, that there was a trade-off between efficiency 
gained through specialisation and improved resilience from diversification. 
According to Menter a Busnes increased competitiveness and efficiency 
through specialisation could increase exposure to risk, as income became 
‘less diversified’.109
134. The Irish agriculture and food development authority, Teagasc, agreed that 
the downside of product diversification was that it was “likely to lead to a less 
efficient and productive agri-food sector as research has shown that more 
103 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
104 Written evidence from Professor Lloyd, Professor McCorriston, and Professor Morgan ; Written 
evidence from Professor Ian Hodge (RPV0016)
105 Written evidence from Rural Business Research (RPV0008)
106 Written evidence from Rural Business Research (RPV0008)
107 Q 11
108 Written evidence from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Agroecology for Sustainable Food and 
Farming (RPV0031)
109 Written evidence from Menter a Busnes (RPV0030)
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specialised farmers are more efficient”. They added that farmers seeking to 
control fluctuations in their total household income by taking up off-farm 
employment could also inadvertently reduce the efficiency of their farms.110
135. Mr Dunn, from the Tenant Farmers Association, pointed out that tenant 
farmers did not always have the option of diversifying beyond agricultural 
activities, because their tenancy agreements required them to be farmers 
with landlords reluctant to grant consent for it.111
136. The NFU noted that product differentiation and adding value to products 
were yet another way to mitigate the impact of risk, such as the production of 
organic milk, but they “may not suit every business and sector”.112
137. Farmers also have access to a growing number of market based instruments 
to manage price volatility. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Supporting farmers to exit the sector
138. In view of the relatively large size of public subsidy compared with overall 
income, there is a risk that this support may be keeping less progressive 
farmers in business at the expense of new entrants. This suggests that there 
could be a case for government intervention to help farmers struggling to 
cope to retire, allowing new entrants in.
139. The Minister told us that Defra had no plans to encourage farmers to retire 
proactively, but it had started to consider ways to help farmers minded to do 
so:
“We have had some discussions on whether you could have mechanisms 
that enable people to retire with dignity, as it were, and maybe stay on 
the farm but make it possible to allow a new property to be built for a 
new farmer coming in and taking it on. We are keen to encourage such 
things as contract farming and shared farming agreements, which offer 
an opportunity for somebody to step back from the day-to-day running 
of the business while keeping an interest in it and staying in their home. 
We are seeing the development of some models that enable this transfer 
to take place.”113
140. We recommend that the UK Government works to identify the main 
barriers preventing farmers from exiting the sector and investigate 
ways to overcome these barriers. They should consider how Rural 
Development funding can be used to accelerate structural change 
and create opportunities for new entrants into farming.
110 Written evidence from the Irish Food Development Authority Teagasc (RPV0013)
111 Q 24
112 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
113 Q 80
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ChAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL MODELS
The Common Agricultural Policy in context
141. Despite the fact that the EU trades in agricultural commodities in a globalised 
context, the structure of the CAP is unique to the EU. Witnesses told us 
about alternative approaches internationally to promoting resilience in the 
face of price volatility and extended periods of low returns. We had sought 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches in an attempt to 
inform the discussion before the next round of CAP reforms.
142. The majority of the evidence focused on New Zealand, the United States 
of America and Canada. Before making direct comparisons, it is important 
to acknowledge the marked differences between European agriculture and 
agriculture elsewhere. In Europe, agricultural land and rural communities 
tend to be found in close geographic proximity, and sometimes in areas of 
natural beauty, ecological or cultural significance. As a consequence, the 
CAP seeks to support a range of public goods simultaneously. In the US, on 
the other hand, vast farms operate largely unhindered by requirements to 
conserve environmental features: the scale and organisation of agriculture 
in the US mean that it can be separated from other societal operations. 
The varying public policy tools that support agriculture in the EU and its 
international counterparts reflect these underlying differences.
New Zealand
143. The New Zealand model presents a radical alternative to the CAP. The High 
Commissioner, gave a compelling explanation of how in 1985, a range of 
agricultural subsidies were abolished overnight:
“I remember that there was no warning—it was just boompf. There 
were dozens and dozens of support systems, be it from the direct subsidy 
payments and supplementary minimum payments, through fertiliser 
subsidies to incentives to develop land—you name it, there must have 
been 30 or 40 different subsidies just wiped.”114
144. The High Commissioner argued that, ultimately, this change brought about 
greater efficiencies and enhanced innovation in New Zealand’s agricultural 
sector. He told us that in the past, “farmers farmed for subsidies” and spoke 
of the enormous efficiencies brought about within the sheep industry when 
subsidies were removed in the mid-1980s.115
145. At the same time, he told us that a relatively small number of farmers had left 
the industry as a result of the changes:
“It is simply the normal action of business that, when you face the 
prospect of going out of business, you make operation more efficient, 
and it is extraordinary how farmers in New Zealand have made their 
operations more efficient. Some went out of business. We had 80,000 
farmers in New Zealand in the early 1980s, and 1% of them went out of 
business when the subsidies were wiped in 1985.”116
114 Q 56
115 Q 54
116 Q 54
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He went on to explain that the New Zealand Government had provided 
one-off exit packages and some financial advice to farmers to help with the 
transition.
146. Although there was a general consensus among witnesses that a gradual 
move in the EU away from public support was appropriate, there were doubts 
over the wisdom of such a radical and sharp change in policy as occurred 
in New Zealand. Moreover, additional steps would have to be taken if such 
an approach were to be replicated in the EU. Phillip Bicknell, of the NFU, 
argued: “My understanding of New Zealand and the impact there was that 
that was also accompanied by a devaluing of the currency, which helped 
them compete on export markets.”117 The Minister also mentioned the sharp 
depreciation in the New Zealand dollar that had helped them price themselves 
back into world markets, and also touched on further adjustments:
“In some areas, New Zealand also has a different approach from us on 
issues such as animal welfare. We have higher regulatory standards … We 
would want to try to safeguard that. We have a manifesto commitment to 
ensure that in the next round of CAP reform there is greater prominence 
given to issues such as animal welfare. It would not be quite as simple, in 
my view, as just following what New Zealand did, but that is not to say 
that there are not important lessons we could learn.”118
147. Though such a radical change in policy is unlikely to be adopted in the EU, 
one particular aspect of New Zealand policy may merit further attention. 
New Zealand operates an Income Equalisation Scheme designed to address 
farmers’ income variability. The scheme allows farmers to deposit income 
from farming for up to five years with the Inland Revenue, where it earns 
interest. The deposits themselves are tax deductible.119 According to the New 
Zealand High Commissioner, the mechanism allowed farmers to cope with 
volatility by depositing in a good year and withdrawing in a low income year 
to spread their income and reduce their tax liability. He had himself used the 
scheme in the past120.
148. Australia has a similar scheme called farm management deposits (FMD), 
which allows producers in years of high return to deposit money into a tax-
free savings account held by a private financial institution. Australia also has 
five-year income tax averaging. 121
The United States of America
149. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) explained that 
agricultural policy in the US was governed by the Farm Bill, an omnibus 
legislative package. It told us that the 2014 Farm Bill amended previous 
agricultural and related policies and established new policies on a 5-year 
cycle:
“The 2014 farm bill debate took place in a period of high farm prices 
and record farm incomes, and centered on the replacement of fixed 
decoupled payments that went to farmers regardless of market conditions. 
117 Q 16
118 Q 80
119 New Zealand Inland Revenue, Income equalisation scheme : http://www.ird.govt.nz/business-income-tax/ 
income-equalisation/income-equalisation-index.html [accessed 5 May 2016]
120 Q 53
121 Q 56 (Dr Jared Greenville)
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A key element of the … debate was how to target commodity programs 
to provide a safety-net in time of unexpected distress and better help 
farmers manage risk.”122
150. One particular public policy tool arose time and time again in discussions 
about the American approach to supporting agriculture: insurance. As 
the US removed direct support, it began to support commodities through 
subsidised insurance schemes.
151. The USDA outlined the main benefits of government-backed insurance 
schemes. First, they told us that the schemes were a positive substitute for ad 
hoc disaster assistance because producers gained a direct role in managing 
their risks and participated in pooling risk with other producers, by providing 
net contributions in good years to offset losses in bad years. Second, they told 
us that from a budgetary perspective, the cost of a crop insurance programme 
was more predictable, because producers received indemnity payments in a 
timely manner when funds were most needed rather than having to wait for 
the processing of ad hoc disaster payments.123
152. The USDA was cautious about recommending such a scheme to the EU. 
The insurance market for agriculture in the EU is underdeveloped, and the 
evidence suggests that were the EU to move towards an insurance based 
model, premiums would probably need to be subsidised, as is the practice in 
the US. The Minister questioned whether the level of premiums would be 
affordable for farmers drawing on insurance schemes on a regular basis:
“Sometimes the difficulty is in insuring risks where there are regular 
calls on that insurance. Farming is famously a very risky thing to do 
because none of us can control the weather, and crops are particularly 
exposed. Sometimes, the cost that an insurance company will put on 
underwriting that risk is very high.”124
153. The Minister also questioned whether such a method of insurance would be 
best offered by the private or public sector and expressed caution about the 
complexity of the US model:
“The big argument against what they are doing in the US is that it 
is incredibly bureaucratic and administrative. We are in the business 
of trying to get away from an incredibly bureaucratic and heavily 
administrative CAP in Europe. We would like to move to something 
simpler and more logical.”125
154. DG AGRI explained that the two models were not directly comparable, and 
reflected significant institutional, budgetary and structural differences:
“US agriculture is characterized by a legislative process whereby the 
representation of farm interests in one legislative body is disproportionate 
to demographic reality, no budgetary constraint exists on farm policy 
implementation, and the agricultural sector is essentially supply-
driven, relying on land abundance and on primarily bulk commodity 
production. It is thus rather simplistic, naive and deceiving to consider 
that such a comparison could be useful for EU agriculture.”
122 Written evidence from the United States Department of Agriculture (RPV0032)
123 Written evidence from the United States Department of Agriculture (RPV0032)
124 Q 77
125 Q 77
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155. It added that another difference was that over 90% of US payments to risk 
management schemes went to just three crops—maize, wheat and soybeans.126
Canada
156. Under the Canadian Growing Forward 2 (2013–2018) policy initiative, a 
suite of programmes is in place to enable farmers to cope with variations 
in income over time and improve their resilience, collectively known as the 
Business Risk Management (BRM) tools127. These comprise:
• AgriStability—a margin-based programme that provides income 
support to an individual (or business entity) who declares agricultural 
income for tax purposes when that producer experiences substantial 
falls in earnings;
• AgriInvest—savings accounts for producers that provide flexible 
coverage for small income declines and support investments that help 
mitigate risks or improve market income;
• AgriInsurance—which provides producers with cost-shared insurance 
for natural hazards in order to minimize the financial implications of 
production and/or asset losses;
• AgriRecovery—a framework (rather than a single programme) that 
guides how federal-provincial-territorial governments work together 
to assess the impacts of disasters on Canada’s agricultural producers 
and respond with timely, targeted initiatives where there is need for 
assistance beyond ongoing programming.
157. The similarities between AgriInvest and the New Zealand Income 
Equalisation scheme are significant. The AgriInvest account builds as a 
farmer makes annual deposits based on a percentage of his Allowable Net 
Sales (ANS) and receives matching contributions from federal, provincial, 
and territorial governments. Since 2013, farmers have been able to deposit up 
to 100% of their ANS annually, with the first 1% matched by governments. 
The limit on matching government contributions is $15,000 CAD per year. 
The financial institution notifies Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada once 
a deposit has been made and the matching government contribution is 
credited to the account. This approach supports farmers who invest and take 
responsible long term decisions.
158. The Minister, George Eustice MP, praised the simplicity of the Canadian 
AgriStability scheme:
“The US has one, which is very complex and looks at different incomes, 
state by state, crop by crop. It makes it a very difficult scheme to manage 
administratively. Most people would agree that the Canadian model 
is probably the simplest, where they simply target a sharp fall in farm 
incomes and basically take that as a proxy for something going wrong in 
the sector, either with price or indeed with crops … I think the Canadian 
model is the closest we have got to an insurance scheme that works, just 
because of the complexity of the US model.”128
126 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
127 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, List of Programs and Services (5 April 2016): http://www.agr.gc.ca/
eng/programs-and-services/list-of-programs-and-services/?id=1362151577626 [accessed 5 May 2016]
128 Q 77
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He went on to say that the EU might be able to learn lessons from the 
Canadian model in the next round of CAP reform, and could even design a 
system that was simpler still.
159. There are fundamental differences between the organisation and 
structure of the EU agriculture sector and those in Canada, New 
Zealand and the US, especially with regard to scale and amenity and 
environmental use of land. These differences render the models used 
by these countries unsuitable for general application in the EU at the 
present time.
160. Even though the Canadian and US experiences have rather different 
contexts, lessons can be learned on where and how subsidised 
insurance and disaster compensation may be applied.
161. We recommend that the Commission and the UK Government 
undertake a structured review of public investment deposit schemes 
in other countries, with a view to identifying approaches that would 
work in the EU. This would give farmers a secure and guaranteed 
option to save in times of plenty and withdraw in times of need.
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ChAPTER 5: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS
162. Access to finance plays a crucial role in farmers’ ability to withstand shocks 
and improve their levels of resilience. The previous chapter considered 
financial tools being used elsewhere in the world. This chapter brings 
together evidence on the current availability of financial products in the EU 
as well as options for the future.
Access to finance
163. The evidence suggested that while access to finance was not a major problem 
for most farmers at the moment, certain groups, particularly those without 
land ownership, were experiencing specific problems. In particular, we were 
told that a lack of financial instruments to help farmers manage volatility 
might hamper their ability to make long-term investments.
164. The AHDB argued that banks “appear to be fairly keen to lend to farmers 
that own their land as debt to asset ratios look generally favourable”, but 
noted that farmers with limited assets, such as tenant or contract farmers, 
struggled more with securing finance and coping with the impact of volatility:
“This is important as anecdotally, the businesses / individuals that farm 
the land are becoming increasingly detached from land ownership. 
With this in mind, lending longer-term into agriculture could be more 
challenging and less informal than, say, overdrafts. This may well 
challenge the industry to think how commercial finance to agriculture 
works and how it flexes around the commodity cycle.”129
165. We also heard from commercial banks of some of the challenges facing 
agricultural banking, from high capital costs to a lack of business skills by 
loan applicants. Barclays Agriculture told us that “the very high capital 
cost compared with the quite thin margins, especially at the moment 
with possibly no margins”, pose difficulties in agricultural banking. They 
also noted challenges in lending to tenant farmers with increasingly short 
tenancies restricting the period over which money could be lent.130 HSBC 
added, though, that landlords could provide a source of support and capital 
to help make projects viable.131 Both Barclays Agriculture and HSBC noted 
the paramount importance of farmers having the skills to put together a 
credible business plan.132
Market-based solutions
166. Farmers wishing to mitigate price risk have at their disposal a number of 
market-based solutions, including forward contracts, futures markets, swaps 
and options, and similar over-the-counter products. According to Defra, 
farmers have used such tools for a long time in the United States, where 
agricultural commodity prices fluctuate widely. They noted that in Europe, 
in contrast, many farmers were unaccustomed to such hedging instruments, 
because the CAP had historically supported prices and provided substantial 
subsidies.133
129 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
130 Q 67
131 Q 67
132 Q 67
133 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 00:01 MONDAY 16 MAY 2016  
This document is issued in advance by the House of Lords on the strict understanding that no publicity may be given to the text 
of the report before the above time and date.
36 PRICE VOLATILITY AND AGRICULTURAL RESILIENCE
167. The evidence suggested that the uptake of such instruments varied widely, 
depending on farm type and other factors such as size, skills and attitude to 
risk. Futures markets, for example, have been confined to a limited number 
of sectors, while economically better performing farms are better able make 
use of such instruments.
Futures markets
168. The AHDB told us that futures markets were already well established in 
cereals and oilseeds, but that the characteristics of other commodities, 
such as their scale and perishability, presented challenges.134 The NFU 
confirmed that market based instruments such as futures worked well in the 
cereals sector, because the product could be stored and shipped globally, and 
because there were enough buyers and sellers.
169. The evidence suggested, however, that there may be potential to develop 
similar markets in sectors identified as more challenging, such as dairy, with 
public support.
170. Dairy UK, the trade association for the dairy supply chain, noted that a 
developed futures market for dairy would enable some farmers to manage 
price risk by fixing some or all of their income in advance, and that by using 
the market in conjunction with forward contracts covering farm inputs, such 
as wheat, dairy farmers would be able to fix their margins.
171. The Minister, George Eustice MP, noted that Defra had set up a team to 
explore how the UK Government could help to develop a futures market 
for the dairy sector. The plan was to model it on the Chicago cash-settled 
market for dairy products: “London is the world’s financial centre and we do 
lots of futures and commodities already. It would be the right place to have 
such a market”.135
172. The UK Government’s efforts to explore how a futures market for 
dairy could be established in the UK is a positive step and there 
may be scope to expand this exploration of futures markets to other 
commodities in the future.
Insurance schemes
173. Many witnesses displayed an interest in government-supported insurance 
schemes to assist farmers in managing farm risk, as an alternative to the 
current approach to public support. Such schemes, as we have noted in 
Chapter 4, are used extensively in the US and Canada.
174. Defra warned that “genuine insurance schemes” should be differentiated 
from payments to producers in times of “adverse” market conditions. They 
told us that a distinction should be drawn between ‘counter-cyclical’ payments 
triggered by changes in incomes, administered by government and funded 
by taxpayers, and insurance relating to a single or multiple risks, provided by 
the private sector with farmers contributing in the form of premiums.136
134 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
135 Q 76
136 Supplementary evidence from Defra (RPV0034)
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Insurance under the Common Agricultural Policy
175. There has been a move towards offering public support for insurance 
schemes in the EU in recent years. The latest reform of the CAP offered 
Member States the possibility to use Rural Development funds for financial 
contributions to insurance premiums, covering losses caused by adverse 
climatic events, animal or plant diseases, pest infestation, or an environmental 
incident. Other options under the new Risk Management Toolkit included 
contributions either to mutual funds dealing with the same range of events, 
or to mutual funds dealing with a severe drop in farm incomes (the Income 
Stabilisation Tool) (see Chapter 3).
176. Defra noted that this toolkit was designed to comply with WTO rules, 
allowing the insurance and mutual fund products to cover only losses greater 
than 30% of production or income.137
177. Nevertheless, EU Member States have so far made little use of the risk 
management options available. DG AGRI noted that only 12 out of 28 
Member States had programmed the whole or part of the toolkit in their 
Rural Development Programmes (RDPs). A large part of this total public 
expenditure of €2.7 billion, targeting 644,487 farmers, was programmed 
under the Italian, French, and Romanian RDPs. Insurance premiums made 
up the majority of the expenditure at €2.2 billion, while €357 million was 
programmed to be spent on mutual funds, and €130 million on the Income 
Stabilisation Tool.138
178. Defra told us that England and the rest of the UK had chosen not to make 
use of the Risk Management Toolkit, due to at least in part to the small 
budget available after the risk management options were moved from Pillar 1 
(Direct Payments) to Pillar 2 (Rural Development) in the most recent CAP 
reform. It noted that the UK’s allocation under Pillar 2 was the smallest per 
hectare in the EU.139
179. The AHDB told us that insurance premiums would need to be subsidised to 
be commercially viable, as is the case in the US:
“With traditional insurance the policy covers high impact, low likelihood 
events. In insuring volatility though, the events are high impact, high 
likelihood, which would make premiums commercially unviable. This 
would likely require the CAP to subsidise premiums and/or underwrite 
the risk.”140
180. Farm Europe, a think tank, argued that existing market mechanisms had 
proved insufficient to respond to crises, as demonstrated by the recent 
difficulties experienced by the dairy sector, and that the EU, with its greater 
resources, should take the lead:
“Due to the very large financial requirements associated with price 
insurance schemes … they should be designed and supported at EU 
level, with CAP funding. It is unrealistic in our opinion to expect price 
insurance to be implemented only at national or sub-national level, as it 
is highly unlikely that the financial needs to cope with sharp price falls 
would be available.”141
137 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
138 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
139 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
140 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
141 Written evidence from Farm Europe (RPV0015)
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181. DG AGRI disagreed, on the other hand, while acknowledging that 60% of 
USA payments had recently gone to risk management schemes, noted that 
more than 90% of these payments had gone to just three crops. Moreover, 
the percentage of payments going to insurance could be expected to shift 
substantially each year when prices declined. It argued that the EU’s policy 
design, spreading support over the whole agricultural sector, had made EU 
farm income less volatile than that in the US in recent years.142
182. Tassos Haniotis, Director of the Economic Analysis, Perspectives and 
Evaluations, and Communication Directorate in DG AGRI, pointed out 
that US insurance schemes were based on commodities with a long tradition 
of using financial markets with data going back to the 1930s, adding that the 
private sector did not dare to take up areas covering plant or animal diseases. 
He said:
“We have seen what an EU-wide risk management scheme … would 
cost, which would imply cuts in other parts, and would have significant 
transfers among commodities and among member states towards the 
ones that are much more volatile price-wise, but not necessarily with 
lower income.143
183. Many witnesses noted the difficulty of developing well-functioning insurance 
markets. Teagasc pointed out that the US crop insurance programme started 
to subsidise premiums for farmers in order to overcome issues such as 
asymmetric information between insurers and the insured; adverse selection 
(voluntary schemes attracting farmers with more volatile incomes); moral 
hazard (insurance against losses encouraging more risky behaviour); and 
crowding out by government when it offers emergency packages to everyone 
and not just those insured. These issues were barriers for private companies 
seeking to enter the market, as they could only offer policies at prices that 
were unaffordable to most farmers.144
184. The OECD, on the other hand, cautioned that “simply providing the 
subsidy for an insurance premium does not overcome the reason why the 
market is not there”. Dr Jared Greenville, Senior Agriculture Policy Analyst 
at the OECD argued that high transaction costs were the main reason why 
insurance markets did not exist in the EU:
“There is a real risk that, with poorly designed schemes, workers just 
count on cyclical payments, which means that you get production that 
does not respond to changes in prices and events. You could run into 
environmental problems by encouraging people to hold stock and just 
continue practices when it is not necessarily a good idea to do so”.145
185. Nick Tapp agreed that insurance schemes could remove some market signals 
to the farmer, while representing “substantial costs” to the taxpayer.146
Insurance and Direct Payments
186. Several witnesses warned that designing insurance schemes for agriculture 
would be complex and would divert funding from Direct Payments. 
142 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
143 Q 48
144 Written evidence from the Irish Food Development Authority Teagasc (RPV0013)
145 Q 59
146 Written evidence from Nick Tapp (RPV0005)
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According to the NFU, experience had shown that mutual funds and 
insurance schemes “are likely to be complex and may undermine the value of 
the decoupled payments”, which were themselves essential risk management 
tools.147
187. We also heard that Direct Payments could hinder the development of 
insurance schemes. Lindsay Sinclair, Group Chief Executive at NFU 
Mutual, a mutual company offering insurance, told us:
“We believe that the presence of direct payments influences our 
customers’ views about the necessity of business interruption insurance, 
and there is a much lower take-up among farming customers of business 
interruption insurance than there is among non-farming commercial 
customers in the belief that they will have an income anyway.”148
188. In fact several witnesses suggested that Direct Payments and insurance 
schemes should be seen as alternatives, rather than complementary 
approaches. Defra noted:
“Other countries, such as Canada, who have extensive insurance support 
(and who were the inspiration for the Income Stabilisation Tool) have 
these supports instead of the direct payments we use in the EU, not 
alongside them. The recent US Farm Bill which moved US policy to 
being centred on insurance, also removed their direct payments.”149
189. The OECD agreed that US and Canadian style insurance markets “should 
not sit on top of the income support arrangements”, which themselves 
brought a degree of risk management.150
190. Subsidised insurance schemes should not replace the current 
provision of support through the CAP. Uncertainty over costs and 
administrative complexity weigh against such a change. Nevertheless, 
we believe that insurance instruments may have a supplementary role 
to play in helping to counter the effects of extreme weather events, for 
example, and therefore should not be ruled out entirely.
191. We recommend that the UK Government give further consideration 
to the use of the mutual fund option within the risk management 
toolkit available under Pillar 2 of the CAP.
The role of public policy
192. Public policy, both at national and EU level, can play a key role in facilitating 
the development of and access to various financial instruments to help 
farmers cope with price volatility.
193. Defra noted that using futures markets to cope with price volatility, or 
taking out insurance for specific crop risks, targeted less probable and more 
damaging risks, which were therefore more marketable. Nevertheless, it 
added that there could be a role for the UK Government to help such private 
sector tools grow.151
147 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
148 Q 70
149 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
150 Q 62
151 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
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194. The Agricultural Industries Confederation, the trade association for 
companies supplying inputs to the agricultural sector, argued:
“On an ongoing basis there is merit in EU institutions, in conjunction 
with national governments, ensuring they have sufficient information 
to determine to what extent these risk management tools are being used 
and, through consultation with industry, to determine whether future 
regulatory change is necessary or desirable.”152
Financial Instruments and the European Investment Bank
195. The Commission, in co-operation with the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), has already launched work to develop financial instruments that 
Member States can offer their farmers. Such financial instruments are 
defined in EU law as:
“Union measures of financial support provided on a complementary 
basis from the budget in order to address one or more specific policy 
objectives of the Union. Such instruments may take the form of equity 
or quasi-equity investments, loans or guarantees, or other risk-sharing 
instruments, and may, where appropriate, be combined with grants.”153
196. DG AGRI told us: “The idea is to try to provide, in the form of easier 
loans or guarantees from the money that is available in rural development, 
the possibility for farmers to get loans with better conditions.” It stressed, 
however, that the work was still in progress.154
197. Dr Harald Jahn, Head of Division, Natural Resources and Agro-Industry at 
the EIB, noted that the EIB’s assignment from the Commission was to help 
commercial banks to grow their lending portfolio for farmers:
“Compared with commercial bank finance, the loan from financial 
instruments can be provided on preferential terms and conditions, inter 
alia the lower interest rates that the EIB can generate on the international 
capital markets. There are longer repayment periods … and perhaps 
less collateral required for tenant farmers. We are working on guarantee 
instruments, which can also be used to leverage further investment 
funding from the private banking sector.155
198. The first new product developed by the EIB, a model guarantee instrument 
for agriculture to ease access to finance for farmers and other rural businesses, 
was presented in March 2015.156
199. For farmers to access any financial instrument scheme developed by the EIB, 
Member States must first create a financial instrument and programme it in 
152 Written evidence from the Agricultural Industries Confederation (RPV0023)
153 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002, Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012
154 Q 49
155 Q 65
156 European Commission, Press release 23 March 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4647 
_en.htm [accessed 5 May 2016]
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their RDP. A farmer may then apply by submitting a business proposal to the 
financial institutions through which funding is channelled.157
200. EU Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan urged agriculture ministers at 
the Agriculture Council in March to make use of the options offered by the 
EIB:
“The legal framework is in place and the Commission and the EIB are 
offering support and guidance to Member States in relation to setting 
up financial instruments. Colleagues, the ball is in your court—it is time 
for Member States to act.”158
201. Defra told us that the Government was “actively considering the introduction 
of financial instruments in the new Rural Development Programme”.159
202. The Minister said the Government was exploring, in particular, whether it 
would be possible to access rural development funds through the EIB “to 
make available loan finance to build additional processing capacity for the 
dairy sector”. The Minister did not, however, commit to actively encouraging 
the uptake of such loans by farmers: “The reality is that, if you are making 
available loan finance on quite generous terms, you probably would not have 
to promote it very hard. I am sure there would be quite a few takers.”160
203. The UK Government has a key role in facilitating the use of financial 
instruments by farmers as the options offered by the EIB need to 
be constructed within the Rural Development Programmes. We 
recommend that the UK Government promote the use of financial 
instruments and raise awareness among farmers with operations of 
different sizes and in different sectors.
204. At the same time, there is scope for the EIB to accelerate its work and to 
communicate the benefits for farmers more effectively. UK farming union 
presidents Allan Bowie, (NFU Scotland), Meurig Raymond (NFU), Ian 
Marshall (Ulster Farmers’ Union), and Stephen James (NFU Cymru) 
argued:
“Work with the European Investment Bank needs to be speeded up. 
There are a range of financial instruments but we need to understand 
how best this will work and what farmers can do to benefit from EIB 
lending.”161
205. In addition to its ongoing work with the EIB, the Commission has announced 
the establishment of a new High Level Group to work on market-based 
solutions, as part of its September 2015 package of measures to help farmers. 
The Group was tasked with focusing on credit for farmers, and financial 
157 European Commission, Questions & Answers in relation to the Memorandum of Understanding in respect 
of cooperation in agriculture and rural development within the EU between the European Commission and the 
European Investment Bank (23 March 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/2015/ec-eib-coop/
qa-mou-ec-eib_en.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
158 Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan at the Agriculture Council, Statement: The use of Financial 
Instruments in the Agriculture Sector, (14 March 2016): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/commissioner-
speeches/pdf/hogan-2016–03-14-agrifish-council-financial.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
159 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
160 Q 75
161 NFU Scotland, UK Farming Union Presidents Say New Farming Measures are a Step in Right Direction, 
(15 Mach 2016): http://www.nfus.org.uk/news/2016/march/uk-farming-union-presidents-say-new-
farming-measures-are-step-right-direction [accessed 5 May 2016]
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and risk management instruments such as futures markets for agricultural 
products.162 Defra noted that: “These markets do not guarantee high prices, 
but are a way of dealing with unanticipated price volatility.”163
206. We recommend that the UK Government works with the private 
sector in developing new financial tools which could be accessed 
under Pillar 2 of the CAP.
207. We urge the EIB to speed up the work on financial instruments and 
work more closely with Member State governments and agricultural 
bodies to disseminate their work.
208. The success of the Commission’s efforts to promote the use of financial 
instruments will ultimately depend on their inclusion by Member 
States in Rural Development Programmes. It was disappointing that 
the UK Government was unable to provide us with an assurance that 
they will make use of any of the options being developed by the EIB.
Barriers to the use of financial instruments
209. Even if useful financial instruments are developed, there are still significant 
barriers to their use, including a lack of knowledge and experience among 
farmers.
210. The NFU said that most farmers “lack the technical knowledge and 
confidence required to utilise market-based instruments”. They added:
“The introduction of new financial products must be accompanied by 
a campaign to educate farmers on the applicability of such products 
to their business … As an ancillary activity for farmers, market-based 
instruments must be easy to implement and manage.”
211. CRM Commodities, an independent grain marketing consultancy, noted 
that information was available online to educate farmers, but it was 
“rather complex”, while “only a limited amount can be learnt from reading 
documents”. It suggested that the solution required continuous training and 
advice to keep farmers up to date with changing markets:
“Policy and funding can encourage farmers to acquire these skills, but 
our experience has been that this rural funding has been hard to acquire 
particularly in recent years and therefore many farmers continue to use 
relatively primitive forms of marketing without fully embracing what is 
on offer. Governments could also look into providing ‘education credits’ 
to farmers encouraging them to take on ongoing education programs on 
this topic as part of the Common Agricultural Policy.”164
212. The AHDB said that registering trade options and becoming involved in 
financial instruments to manage risk was a “big change of mindset” for 
farmers. To find solutions, it had established a volatility forum to bring the 
academic and commercial worlds together with the farming community:
“There are a number of areas that we are really keen to look at, whether it 
is forward contracts, forward pricing, the use of derivatives, co-operation 
162 European Commission, Annex: Comprehensive package of measures, Fact Sheet (7 September 2015): 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5601_en.htm [accessed 5 May 2016]
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and integration, people creating more strategic balanced businesses or 
how government policy might be involved to help us manage some of 
that volatility.” 165
213. According to Teagasc, “major education and outreach initiatives” would be 
required to make financial instruments, such as forward contracts, futures 
markets, swaps and options, commonplace in European farming. It added 
that such market-based risk management tools had a much longer history in 
the US, which also has a very different scale of farming.166
214. Indeed, the size of farming as a business operation and the level of cash-flows 
involved were identified as barriers to farmers’ use of financial instruments. 
The NFU argued that the majority of farmers, as individual enterprises, 
lacked the scale to engage directly in a futures market. They currently relied 
on processors and traders to utilise market-based instruments to manage 
volatility: “For farmers to directly benefit, financial products must consider 
the scale of farming operations”.167
215. Dairy UK argued that Member States should be allowed to use EU Rural 
Development funds to educate dairy farmers on the use of financial 
instruments:
“Whilst other agricultural sectors such as cereals are already fully 
familiar with futures instruments, this is not the case for dairy. It will 
take an extensive programme of training and education in the sector 
before dairy farmers can see the benefits of using futures and are familiar 
with how they can be exploited.” 168
216. CRM Commodities added that farmers trading in futures markets also faced 
a risk of extra cash flow demands in the period between the hedge being 
placed and the physical being sold. This was a deterrent for farmers whose 
cash flow was already tight.
217. We recommend that the European Commission and Member State 
governments work proactively with the financial sector to develop 
and promote more accessible and practical risk management tools.
218. Government policy should ensure that provision is made for 
training and education to farmers in accessing and making use of 
new financial instruments. We encourage bodies who have a role in 
providing advice to famers, such as levy boards, to commit sufficient 
resources for this task.
The availability of data
219. We heard that the availability of transparent price data was a prerequisite 
to developing tools to manage price risk, and also that there was a role for 
public policy to encourage the provision of such data. According to the 
NFU, a lack of publicly available data for price and volumes traded affected 
price discovery and consequently discouraged farmers from participating 
in market based solutions by reducing their confidence in the pricing of 
derivatives: “Greater market transparency will encourage participation in 
165 Q 30
166 Written evidence from the Irish Food Development Authority Teagasc (RPV0013)
167 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
168 Written evidence from Dairy UK (RPV0026)
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the financial markets as no participant in the supply chain will be able to 
benefit from asymmetric information.”169 The AHDB called for mandatory 
price reporting to help price discovery.170
220. Defra noted progress in this area, arguing that the Commission was 
concentrating increasingly on improving market transparency and on 
disseminating relevant information within the food supply chain. The 
Department argued that the EU Milk Market Observatory was “evolving 
into an important facility for improving price transparency and access to data 
and analysis of future market trends”. The Commission has since launched 
similar tools for beef, cereals, pigmeat, poultry and sugar.171
221. The AHDB added that well-functioning insurance schemes, be it for 
margin, income or other types of schemes popular in the US, would require 
“robust systems and good quality data”.172 Rural Business Research agreed 
that supporting the development of such schemes required independent and 
generally accepted data on farm performance.173
222. Defra also noted that running counter-cyclical payments schemes would 
require significant data input:
“Indeed this is a substantial barrier in the short-term to medium-term 
development of any scheme in the UK as information on the individual 
income of farmers is not available.”174
Regulatory burdens
223. Many witnesses warned of the extra regulatory burden that would fall 
on farms—often small-scale businesses—with greater use of financial 
instruments. The AHDB argued that “purely ‘financial’ instruments are 
unlikely to be of much use to farmers with business size and regulation 
preventing direct access”. It noted that the increasing amount of regulation 
aimed at ensuring that such instruments were not misused by speculators 
could itself give rise to additional volatility. Policy areas such as the revised 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)175, which aims 
to increase transparency and oversight of financial markets, including 
derivatives markets, could make it more challenging for farmers to use formal 
market based instruments.176
224. MiFID II177, was agreed in 2014. The NFU noted that the rules would 
capture for the first time non-financial businesses producing, trading or 
processing physical commodities with a futures market in the EU, such as 
169 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
170 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
171 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
172 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
173 Written evidence from Rural Business Research (RPV0008)
174 Supplementary evidence from Defra (RPV0034)
175 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12 
June 2014, p. 349–496)
176 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
177 The MiFID II Package comprises two pieces of legislation, the Directive (see above) and Regulation 
(EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, p 84–
148).
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agricultural commodities, including wheat, milk or rapeseed. Farmers could, 
however, be exempted from complying with the rules.178
225. Regulatory and implementing technical standards under the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) should not place an 
unfeasible burden on farmers, which might discourage them from 
using financial risk management instruments.
National policies
226. Some witnesses identified further opportunities for Member States to 
provide support to farmers outside the framework of the CAP, notably 
through taxation systems.
227. The UK Government extended its existing system of tax averaging for 
farmers in the 2015 Budget. From April 2016, farmers will be able to average 
out their farming profits over five years instead of two for tax purposes. 
Defra told us that this should help farmers manage fluctuations in income 
caused by industry specific factors “from price movements in global markets 
to swings in yields caused by the weather or by disease”.179
228. The AHDB, on the other hand, called for the development of further products 
allowing farmers to “save efficiently in good times to offset the bad”.180 One 
example of such a practice is New Zealand’s Income Equalisation Scheme 
(see Chapter 3).
229. We consider that national taxation policies can make a major 
contribution by developing regimes such as sheltered reserves and 
income averaging. The UK Government’s extension of the system 
of tax averaging for farmers announced in the 2015 Budget was a 
positive development.
178 NFU, NFU influences EU directive on futures market (20 April 2016): http://www.nfuonline.com/
assets/61790 [accessed 5 May 2016]
179 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
180 Written evidence from AHDB (RPV0020)
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ChAPTER 6: RESEARCh, INNOVATION AND SKILLS
230. The ability of agriculture to cope with price volatility and periods of sustained 
low prices reflects the state of scientific knowledge and the proficiency with 
which this is transferred to farmers and applied in practice. This chapter 
examines the debate surrounding the dissemination of knowledge and the 
latest scientific developments to farm level and it also presents the case 
for farmers to be more proficient in modern business practices, which 
would include access to knowledge and the use of financial instruments as 
mentioned in the previous chapter.
Public investment
231. Historically, scientific advances have repeatedly led to improvements in 
agricultural productivity, which in turn help to improve resilience. The 
Minister presented a positive picture of current UK science and research in 
agriculture:
“One of the great resources we have in this country is world-beating 
science. We have some excellent science going on at places like John 
Innes and universities like Harper Adams, and places like Rothamsted 
as well. We obviously have the agritech strategy, and through that we are 
supporting a number of centres of excellence.”181
232. The NFU, in contrast, expressed disappointment with both the levels of 
domestic research funding in the UK and the precautionary approach of the 
EU to new technologies:
“We are still feeling the effects of the well documented underinvestment 
in agricultural science over recent decades, a shift in focus away from 
production, and the reduction of people and resources needed for 
translational research and commercialisation … It is deeply disappointing 
that EU policy and legislation appears sceptical at best, often opposed, 
to new technologies that offer farm businesses the ability to manage 
plant and animal disease, weeds and pests, so reducing the EU food 
system’s ability to manage volatility sustainably.”182
233. DG AGRI told us that the Commission was committed to public spending on 
research and innovation and that agricultural research was being prioritised 
in the current financial period:
“For the sake of comparison in 2011 the EU represented 15.4% of 
global public research spending, the USA 10.1% and China 23.6%. 
Research and innovation investments in agriculture are not just crucial 
for sustainability of agro-food systems in Europe but also for their 
competitiveness on global market … we have doubled the funds to 
agricultural research in the current financial period … We have included 
all the priorities that we have seen are extremely important, from animal 
and plant diseases that are spreading faster because of climate change to 
issues related to food security and land management.”183
181 Q 82
182 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
183 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027) and Q 44
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Public-private partnership
234. In the US, agricultural research is funded from the public and private sectors, 
but, as the USDA told us, the funding tends to focus on different areas:
“Federal and State-level public spending on food and agricultural 
research totals approximately $5 billion annually; private sector entities 
invest an additional $5-6 billion … While private investment is most 
heavily concentrated in food manufacturing and crop development, 
public investment is more broadly distributed, with concentrations not 
only in crop and animal breeding, but also in environment and natural 
resources and human nutrition and food safety.”184
DG AGRI praised the US approach to research, extension and innovation 
systems, acknowledging that Europe had a lot to learn and apply.185
235. Public-private partnerships also have a role to play. The New Zealand High 
Commissioner explained how in New Zealand, agricultural research was a 
joint enterprise with the government and the private sector sharing costs 
50:50.186
236. He cautioned against governments acting alone in research provision and 
funding:
“It is up to the farming sector and the agricultural industry itself to 
organise its distribution of information … They are all involved in the 
extension of the latest research information from around the country 
and around the world. Farmers naturally look towards that, because they 
know that they need the latest information to manage their businesses. 
So it is a sort of two-way process. The more that Governments get 
involved in providing these things free, the less valued they are.”187
237. The OECD extolled the benefits of co-funding research between the private 
and public sectors, arguing that research and development funding was 
directed towards the projects that the industry wants and needs:
“These co-funding arrangements and the more co-operative research 
structure have proved beneficial … It is about trying to exploit the best 
of both worlds—get the best out of the private sector contribution, 
where competitive funding models, and so forth, have been used, as well 
as then making the most of your government spend.”188
238. The funding of agricultural research should be recognised as a 
priority for both the UK Government and the European Commission. 
We recommend that they do much more to promote links between 
research projects and agribusinesses. Joint commitment between the 
European Commission, Member State governments and the private 
sector will ensure that research efforts are focused on the areas of 
greatest need.
184 Written evidence from the United States Department of Agriculture (RPV0032)
185 Q 47
186 Q 60
187 Q 61
188 Q 60
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239. Although industry and government can be positive drivers of scientific 
research, the NFU were clear that scientific research should come before 
policy decisions, rather than the other way around:
“Legislation and government decision-making must be based on robust 
scientific evidence if it is to have the desired effect, avoid unintended 
consequences and stand up to scrutiny.”189
240. There is an important role, however, for policy makers in identifying knowledge 
gaps and commissioning targeted research to inform decision making.This 
Committee voiced concern that the role of Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) to 
the President of the European Commission was discontinued in 2014. This 
was disappointing at the time and remains a cause for concern.
241. The evidence based approach to policy making must be maintained. 
Agricultural research should inform policy direction at both EU 
and Member State level. Public-private partnerships can assist that 
research.
Dissemination of knowledge
242. David Gardner, of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, expressed 
concern that research was too fragmented, and that it was not applied where 
it was needed:
“My great criticism is that nobody pulls all that together and puts it 
into best practice for the farming community. If a really great piece of 
research is done in an institute somewhere, it might come up with one 
bullet point that is really useful for the farming industry and that could 
be applicable to every farming business in the country—but how does 
it get embedded in best practice? At the moment there is no formalised 
process to ensure that that happens. That is the role that, historically, 
the ADAS technical specialists used to fill when I started farming. In 
my view, we have never replaced that role. There is still a gap, and it is 
a big gap.”190
243. ADAS was the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’s (MAFF) 
agricultural advisory arm until it was privatised in 1997. Although the 
current Defra Farming Advice Service provides some help to farmers, it 
generally focuses on helping them to understand and meet the requirements 
of Cross Compliance, Greening (under the Basic Payments Scheme) and 
the European Directives on both water protection and sustainable pesticide 
use.191 Other arrangements are in place in other parts of the UK. In Wales 
the extension service known as Farming Connect (see below) maintains 
many of the functions that have been lost in England.
244. Levy bodies perform an important function in disseminating information 
and facilitating skills’ development, for example by providing support for 
benchmarking. The Minister, George Eustice MP, told us that the statutory 
levy board, the AHDB, was expected to fulfil some of this role. Its role was:
189 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
190 Q 35
191 HM Government, ‘Farming Advice Service’: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/farming-advice-
service [accessed 5 May 2016]
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“to support farming, to commission research and development work 
and to encourage knowledge transfer. They have a very important role 
to play. They do regular statistics and benchmarking to try to help 
farmers recognise where they are and what they could do to improve 
their productivity. There is definitely a role for them there.”192
245. The AHDB agreed with the Minister’s assessment:
“We are well aware that we are not going to recreate the ADAS of the 
1970s and early ’80s. The day of Government paying for extension 
services has gone [in England]. We have to look at doing it in a really 
smart way. The starting point is … benchmarking … We need to be of a 
mindset such that we know that the Danes, the Dutch, the Germans or 
the French are doing something better than we are, and we want to be 
as good as them.”193
246. Defra’s Agricultural technologies (Agritech) Strategy was developed in 
partnership with industry. It aims to ensure that the “knowledge and insight 
from the UK’s … science base are translated into benefits for society and the 
economy at home and abroad.”194 The Strategy was launched in July 2013, 
with £160 million of funding. The NFU said that they had:
“been encouraged by moves to strengthen the links between research 
and practice through the development of the Agri-tech Strategy; but 
the Strategy must deliver for the long term in all sectors. The UK 
Government has a duty to maintain world class expertise and facilities 
in this area, and crucially it must ensure that developments and 
breakthroughs are effectively translated into commercial practice on 
farms across the country—likewise, the end users of innovation need to 
have the right skills to be able to make the best use of the appropriate 
research and technology available to their business.”195
247. The Royal Agricultural Society of England told us that the Agritech Strategy 
was helping with the application of scientific research and they were hopeful 
that the AHDB may develop a more formal role in knowledge transfer:
“There is too much emphasis on basic research and very little on applied 
research … I see no formalised structure to make knowledge transfer/
knowledge exchange happen in an organised way. That might be starting 
to change in terms of what the AHDB has aspirations to do, but it is still 
going through a period of change.”196
248. Lynsey Martin from the National Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs also 
told us of the importance of policy being translated into practical tools: “I 
come back to business. BIS is just as useful to us as Defra, moving forward. 
It is about having access to all the tools that we can use to improve our 
business and make it more efficient.”197
192 Q 81
193 Q 22
194 HM Government, UK Agricultural Technologies Strategy (24 December 2013): https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/uk-agricultural-technologies-strategy [Accessed 5 May 2016]
195 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
196 Q 35
197 Q 26
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249. Eirwen Williams, Director of Menter a Busnes, which delivers Farming 
Connect in Wales, agreed and spoke of the “disconnect between the blue-
sky academic research” and what made a difference at farm level:
“One of the things the AHDB needs to deliver is making sure that the 
work that is being done is relevant to challenges on the farm and not 
something that looks good in an academic paper. It must address the 
needs of farmers today.”198
250. Professor Wilson, in contrast, argued that such knowledge transfer was 
already happening, and suggested that the ultimate application of research 
could act as an incentive:
“I am well aware that the drive now is around the impact of research. 
It is a great thing, from my point of view, that we do research and have 
to translate that to the sector where it is needed. From our perspective, 
getting those agricultural innovations that we do in a researchled 
university like Nottingham through to farming is a good thing. It 
incentivises us to do that and we are all up for it.”199
251. The USDA told us that in the US Federal and State-level spending on 
knowledge transfer programmes, including extension services and technical 
assistance totals around $5 billion annually. They also described their system 
of knowledge exchange:
“Farmers in the US have access to county, state, and national-
level extension and education programs tailored to transferring new 
knowledge and providing training to working farmers across the full 
range of research topics pursued in USDA, including agricultural 
production practices and new technologies; business management 
and economics; natural resources management, climate change, and 
conservation; markets and trade; among others. Producers also have 
direct access to a wide range of publicly available reports, websites, web-
based management tools, and advisory services both electronically and 
through local USDA offices”.200
252. It was clear that there were different levels of progress in this area across the 
United Kingdom. Menter a Busnes told us about the work that they were 
doing to facilitate knowledge exchange in Wales:
“Menter a Busnes and [the Institute of Biological, Environmental and 
Rural Sciences at the University of Aberystwyth] have recently established 
a Knowledge Exchange Hub to improve and facilitate the progression 
of new ideas and technologies to the agricultural and forestry sectors. 
The Knowledge Exchange Hub will provide a mechanism for assisting 
the flow of information from research projects into industry as well as 
keeping abreast of new research and developments in institutes and 
organisations other than IBERS. This will include research institutes 
across the UK and world, other knowledge exchange specialist e.g. levy 
boards, and industrial companies undertaking their own research. In 
addition the Knowledge Exchange Hub will be the point of contact for 
farmers and foresters wishing to access funding through the European 
Innovation Partnerships.”201
198 Q 35
199 Q 22
200 Written evidence from the United States Department of Agriculture (RPV0032)
201 Written evidence from Menter a Busnes (RPV0030)
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253. We were impressed by the breadth and depth of the services provided by 
Menter a Busnes. In Scotland, Scotland’s Rural College (SRUC) also offers 
knowledge-exchange services, specifically skills, education and business 
support, for Scotland’s land-based industries.202
254. Several witnesses highlighted the problems arising from poor broadband 
coverage in rural areas. Menter a Busnes told us:
“It is a problem. It is not fast enough to download videos. On our website 
we have videos and little podcasts of different things that farmers are 
able to download, but because the internet connection is not fast enough 
they cannot download them, so it is definitely an issue in rural Wales.”203
We are concerned that the Government’s broadband Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) may not include a commitment to rolling out broadband 
services in hard-to-reach rural areas in the light of recent reports that the 
forthcoming USO may require individuals to formally request broadband 
provision from providers.204
255. The provision of knowledge exchange and training differs across the 
UK. The UK Government should identify examples of best practice 
of knowledge exchange and dissemination wherever it is to be found 
and actively support them. It should also increase its efforts to deliver 
broadband to ensure that farmers in rural areas can access the 
necessary information online.
Modern business skills
256. A lack of adequate awareness and business skills can impede farmers’ ability 
to cope with risk appropriately. The NFU told us:
“Successful modern farming is a skilled operation that requires technical 
proficiency, business acumen and environmental awareness. The NFU 
believes that promotion of business management and entrepreneurial 
skills is crucial to achieving a professional and more productive, 
profitable and competitive farming sector.”205
257. Defra described their efforts to equip farmers with the tools they need:
“Defra has published a wide range of advice available to farmers, 
including how to write a business plan, manage accounts, undertake 
benchmarking and plan future activity. This includes information 
on specialist business and financial support to help farmers run their 
businesses as efficiently as possible. Advice is also available for farmers 
who are thinking of diversifying, by adding new business activities to 
traditional farming.”206
202 SRUC, ‘Scotland’s Rural College’: http://www.sruc.ac.uk/ [accessed 5 May 2016]
203 Q 32
204 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, A New Broadband Universal Service Obligation Consultation 
(March 2016): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5101 
48/Broadband_Universal_Service_Obligation.pdf, p 10 and BBC, ‘Rural broadband only on request, 
says Government’ (6 May 2016): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36225971 [accessed 11 May 
2016]
205 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
206 Written evidence from Defra (RPV0009)
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258. Benchmarking allows farmers to compare the financial performance of their 
businesses to the performance of average and top performing farms of the 
same farm type. It allows them to compare their profit and loss account, 
gross margins, balance sheet and performance measures. Professor Wilson 
suggested that benchmarking could give farmers a stronger understanding 
of both the cost of production and cost competitiveness and of ways to 
manage them.207 The NFU stressed that benchmarking was of paramount 
importance in improving the performance of agriculture in recent years. It 
noted that the 2011/12 Farm Business Survey showed that 15% of farmers 
who frequently benchmark at whole farm level achieved an average Farm 
Business Income of £128,900 in contrast with £63,000 for the 85% of 
farmers that did not benchmark.208
259. The Farm Business Survey is an annual survey commissioned by the UK 
Government, under which a range of management accounting information 
on all aspects of farmer’s and grower’s businesses is collected. The survey 
uses a representative sample of farms in terms of farm type, farm size and 
regional location, and is carried out by a consortium of seven academic 
institutions. Professor Wilson, who leads the consortium, told us:
“A key determining factor of farm performance is the management 
ability of those individual farm businesses. Anything that allows farmers 
to access greater information—for example, benchmarking, which we 
do within the Farm Business Survey—or allows them to look at their 
costs and revenue moving forward, which again we do with our work 
on our Projection Calculator tool, or which allows people to go in and 
test different price scenarios for their production: all those things need 
to marry together with the innovative practices at production level to 
achieve a successful business.”209
260. Menter a Busnes helps Welsh farmers offers programmes for farmers to 
develop business and management skills. It also organises surgeries with a 
business consultant; business meetings to provide information on employment 
laws, farm accounts, and record keeping; and venture programmes on joint 
opportunities, such as share or contract farming, or succession surgeries 
with a lawyer.210
261. Benchmarking in agriculture should be promoted among the farming 
community and encouraged by the UK Government. There is a long 
term business case for equipping farmers in all parts of the UK with 
the knowledge and expertise to calculate and manage their costs of 
production and overheads. Farmers should share their data with 
their peers to facilitate this benchmarking.
262. The least supported farming sectors appear to possess better business 
skills. Sectors that have enjoyed historic support now face greater 
exposure to market forces and should, as a priority, be equipped with 
the skills to improve business knowledge.
207 Q 22
208 Written evidence from the NFU (RPV0024)
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ChAPTER 7: ThE FUTURE ShAPE OF ThE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
263. The CAP undergoes periodic major reforms and adjustments; it is expected 
to undergo a mid-term review in 2017 and will be revised again for the period 
after 2020. Our recommendations are intended to feed into these revisions, 
though we have also borne in mind any future UK policy landscape, should 
the UK decide to leave the EU in the forthcoming referendum.
Long term objectives
264. The stated official objectives of the CAP remain as they first appeared in 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, though the way they have been interpreted 
has evolved. Box 1 shows how the language used to describe the Policy has 
changed over the decades:
Box 2: The Objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy
1. Treaty of Rome (1957)
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, the wording of which has been carried forward 
into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon, 2007), 
states that the aims of the CAP are:
• To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and 
by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour;
• Thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, 
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture;
• To stabilise markets;
• To assure the availability of supplies;
• To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
2. Agenda 2000
The CAP’s original objectives were reformulated in Agenda 2000 by the 
European Council (the Heads of State and/or government of the Member States, 
its President and the President of the Commission) as follows:
• Increase competitiveness internally and externally in order to ensure that 
Union producers take full advantage of positive world market developments;
• Food safety and food quality, which are both fundamental obligations 
towards consumers;
• Ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and 
contributing to the stability of farm incomes;
• The integration of environmental goals into the CAP;
• Promotion of sustainable agriculture;
• The creation of alternative job and income opportunities for farmers and 
their families;
• Simplification of Union legislation.
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3. Political settlement of 2013
The Council and the European Parliament, agreed the CAP’s long-term 
objectives for the period 2014–2020 as:
• Delivering viable food production;
• Sustainable management of natural resources and climate action;
• Balanced territorial development.
Sources: Summarised from Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union, COM (97) 2000 final, Commission 
of the European Communities and European Commission, ‘Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief No. 5, December 
2013’: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
265. Professor Morgan narrated these changes:
“The common agricultural policy, as it is now, is a very different animal 
from the one that I grew up with in the 1970s and 1980s, when we did 
have butter mountains and wine lakes, and 84% of the [EU] budget went 
to agriculture and 50% of that went to milk, because of the way that the 
market was operated. That was about price intervention; that was about 
subsidies for prices; that was all about market intervention. The current 
CAP is very different. It is not about market intervention; it is about 
support for income. It is not about support for a product; it is support for 
income. It is a very different thing. It is designed to maintain the wider 
aspects of agriculture, the stewardship of the countryside, et cetera. It is 
targeting something quite different from the original ideal of the CAP, 
which was about supporting price. It is a different common agricultural 
policy, even though its name has never changed. It has evolved.”211
Support for public goods
266. Many witnesses argued that the concept of public goods should be set as 
the primary objective of any reformed CAP. Whether it be increased food 
security, environmental sustainability or climate change mitigation, the 
CAP should be holistic and should not simply encourage food production at 
any cost. DG AGRI highlighted the relatively recent shift towards fostering 
a wider array of public goods:
“The objective of the current system of Direct Payments goes far beyond 
a pure income support policy tool … [The objective has made] it possible 
for the legislator to introduce other important policy objectives (such as 
the provisions of public goods) as a pre-condition in order to receive 
support. Decoupled from production decisions, these payments create 
an incentive for agriculture to provide a combination both of private and 
public goods, with the latter further enhanced in the more recent reform 
by making 30% of the payment conditional on greening practices.”212
267. The introduction of greening marked a significant step away from 
unconditional support under Pillar 1, but there is scope for much more. DG 
AGRI went on to tell us that the Policy must always be able to compensate 
farmers for the public goods they provide, which may not be recognised by 
the market:
211 Q 8
212 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
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“Farmers produce public goods, but they also produce private goods. 
Instead of pitting one against the other, we want to bring those together 
in a complementary way. In this design, even for the future, they need 
to have some cushion in the overall income of farmers that would 
compensate them for what the market does not compensate. That 
remains important. One would have to examine whether the manner in 
which we distribute payments in the reference we have, which is land, 
is the most accurate one. In my view, that is where the discussion in the 
future will have to focus.”213
268. It added that decoupled Direct Payments had, by guaranteeing an EU 
wide minimum level of basic income support, also played a major role in 
maintaining agricultural activity throughout the EU territory, avoiding 
negative social consequences in rural areas.214 It told us that combining the 
provision of public and private goods without one overriding the other would 
be challenging:
“That is where volatility and economic viability become important. 
Before everything else, agriculture is an economic sector, and if it is not 
economically viable it will not be viable from an environmental or social 
point of view.”215
269. Historically, market price support under the CAP maintained prices above 
market levels for many products. This generated costs to EU consumers, 
while providing relative price stability for farmers. However, the intensity of 
market intervention has declined significantly as a result of CAP reform since 
the early 1990s, leaving EU markets more open to respond to fluctuations of 
supply and demand. The move from general price support to more targeted 
support can be used to enable the provision of public goods. A return to 
a system of price support and intervention to provide a floor price would 
signal a step back.216
270. The CAP’s objectives go beyond the production of agricultural goods. 
They include the provision of public goods, such as land management 
and maintenance of ecosystem services, as well as the mitigation of 
adverse social impacts in rural economies.
271. Given that the agricultural sector is often expected to provide public 
goods, there is a case for financial support in certain circumstances. 
However, policy should display much more explicit links between the 
expected outcomes and the use of public funds.
272. Another important role for direct support is in the case of market failure. 
Professor McCorriston agreed that this could provide a rationale for 
intervening:
“One of the important issues about whether it is the private or public 
sector, which is a general principle of policy, is whether there is a market 
failure. Can the private sector provide enough on its own to resolve the 
issues of variability? If the answer is no, then there is a potential role for 
an agricultural policy or CAP in some form to deal with that.”217
213 Q 41
214 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
215 Q 50
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217 Q 8
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273. There is a case for public intervention where there is market 
disruption caused by events beyond the control of the industry, such 
as the recent Russian ban on imports from the EU.
274. While DG AGRI’s evidence makes it clear that agriculture and environmental 
policy are strongly interlinked, they are currently often dealt with in separate 
frameworks, which may jeopardise the achievement of the objectives of 
each policy. The Minister noted that the UK was developing separate 25 
year plans for food and farming on the one hand and the environment on 
the other. He said that the agriculture plan would touch on environmental 
issues, but that the environment plan “the right place to deal with all the 
environmental issues, including looking at things such as soil, climate 
change, water resources and everything else”218 We are concerned that this 
separation of the respective policy areas does not demonstrate awareness of 
the interconnectedness of agriculture and the environment, or of the value 
of natural capital.
275. Given the significant synergies between agricultural and 
environmental policies, they should not be treated as separate policy 
areas. We urge the UK Government to demonstrate that their 25 year 
plan for food and farming and their 25 year plan for the environment 
are consistent with and support one another.
Structural change
276. The previous round of CAP reform sought to move some public support from 
Direct Payments and Pillar 1 towards Pillar 2. This movement of support 
from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 may continue in the next round of reforms and more 
funding may be dedicated to environmental services and land management. 
Given that Pillar 2 is co-financed by the Member States, this may not be 
straightforward.
277. DG AGRI presented this as a process of transition:
“I think we should realise that the old distinction between Pillar 1 and 
Pillar 2 is becoming less and less relevant. This distinction was driven by 
the fact that in Pillar 2 we had—and still have—multiannual budgeting 
based on programming, and on Pillar 1 it is annual budgeting and there 
is no programming; it is all financed by the EU. Now we have elements 
of programming and co-financing in the First Pillar, but the most 
important thing that brings these two together is land management.”219
278. The Commission underlined that land management was at the heart of their 
vision for the future of the CAP:
“It is important to start realising that for the same piece of land—one 
hectare of land, for example—you can see differently from a market 
point of view the quantities you produce and what impact it has on 
prices; from a direct payments point of view whether the CAP will 
support it and how much; from an agri-environmental point of view 
what type of additional measures you have; from a control point of view 
how you guarantee this is accurately accounted for; but it is still one 
hectare of land. The crucial question is what type of land, what are the 
soil characteristics, what do they imply regarding future environmental 
218 Q 82
219 Q 42
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challenges, be it climate, soil erosion, water use, or what have you, and 
how all the measures that we have—and they are and should continue to 
be more than one—would act in a complementary manner.”220
279. The Commission’s approach is entirely consistent with our view that the 
provision of public goods must be the overall driving force behind the next 
round of CAP reform. Indeed, as the distinction between Pillar 1 and Pillar 
2 disappears, there is an argument for abolishing the distinction altogether 
and focusing funds on specific public goods.
280. Such a move would allow for EU-wide risks to be more effectively managed 
at EU level and to be addressed and financed from a single source of funding. 
As we noted earlier in Chapter 3, DG AGRI classifies these as market risks 
or broader environmental risks. 221
281. We recommend that the European Commission consider a 
restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy primarily to 
support the provision of public goods.
282. Exposure to market signals is crucial for the self-regulation of agricultural 
production. Forms of support that remove market signals may artificially 
keep inefficient or unproductive farmers in business while preventing younger 
and more skilled farmers from entering the sector and expanding. As has 
been noted, we heard that farmers in historically less supported sectors were 
generally more business-oriented than those in more supported sectors. The 
removal of support may also have wider implications for the rural economy. 
The debate surrounding the role of Direct Payments is discussed in Chapter 
3.
283. Market signals are key to encouraging farmers to take the right 
course of action to increase resilience. This will need to be reflected 
in any future policy to ensure that these signals are not removed.
220 Q 42
221 Written evidence from DG AGRI (RPV0027)
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Price volatility is an inherent feature of agricultural markets, and it will 
remain a normal risk to be managed by farmers as part of their business 
strategies. (Paragraph 29)
2. Despite increased volatility in agricultural prices in recent years, we conclude 
that the overall level of price volatility is no higher than at other times in the 
past. (Paragraph 35)
3. Both price volatility and low prices present challenges for farmers. In our 
opinion, adverse effects at farm level are caused more by unanticipated 
periods of sustained low prices than by an increase in levels of price volatility. 
(Paragraph 46)
4. A degree of price volatility sends crucial market signals, which inform 
production and investment decisions. It also provides incentives for 
innovation and efficiency gains. (Paragraph 59)
5. Preparedness for price movements will assist farmers in their investment and 
business decisions, but it will not eliminate risk. (Paragraph 60)
6. Various sub-groups of farmers experience volatility to different degrees 
and therefore require different strategies and support to strengthen their 
resilience. We recommend that the UK Government encourages tenant 
farmers seeking to diversify and strengthen their resilience. The UK 
Government and the devolved administrations should also investigate the 
impact of short-term tenancies on the ability of farmers to make necessary 
investments. (Recommendation 1, Paragraph 77)
7. Changes to the framework of the CAP have resulted in a greater exposure 
of production decisions to market forces. Direct Payments, however, provide 
income support which maintains a degree of financial stability for some 
farmers. (Paragraph 94)
8. The shift in the CAP towards income support and greening is likely to 
continue. Future policy decisions must focus on addressing the outcomes 
of price volatility and periods of prolonged low prices and help farmers to 
develop resilience mechanisms rather than controlling prices. (Paragraph 
100)
9. While we note the Commission’s ambition to simplify the CAP, the focus 
must be on reducing complexity for the farmers who use it. (Paragraph 101)
10. One-off support packages can help to counter the impact of extreme natural 
disasters or catastrophic events that are beyond individual farmers’ control. 
Policy should, however, focus on building the sector’s resilience in the longer 
term. (Paragraph 106)
11. We recommend that the UK Government clearly articulate the specific 
circumstances under which it will seek to access EU funding to provide 
emergency aid for farmers in the wake of an extreme natural disaster or a 
catastrophic event. (Recommendation 2, Paragraph 107)
12. Direct Payments provide farmers with important income support to 
withstand protracted periods of low prices. They can, however, reduce 
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incentives for innovation and efficiency gains and hold back much needed 
structural change. (Paragraph 124)
13. We recommend that the UK Government works to identify the main barriers 
preventing farmers from exiting the sector and investigate ways to overcome 
these barriers. They should consider how Rural Development funding can 
be used to accelerate structural change and create opportunities for new 
entrants into farming. (Recommendation 3, Paragraph 140)
14. There are fundamental differences between the organisation and structure 
of the EU agriculture sector and those in Canada, New Zealand and the US, 
especially with regard to scale and amenity and environmental use of land. 
These differences render the models used by these countries unsuitable for 
general application in the EU at the present time. (Paragraph 159)
15. Even though the Canadian and US experiences have rather different contexts, 
lessons can be learned on where and how subsidised insurance and disaster 
compensation may be applied. (Paragraph 160)
16. We recommend that the Commission and the UK Government undertake a 
structured review of public investment deposit schemes in other countries, 
with a view to identifying approaches that would work in the EU. This would 
give farmers a secure and guaranteed option to save in times of plenty and 
withdraw in times of need. (Recommendation 4, Paragraph 161)
17. The UK Government’s efforts to explore how a futures market for dairy 
could be established in the UK is a positive step and there may be scope 
to expand this exploration of futures markets to other commodities in the 
future. (Paragraph 172)
18. Subsidised insurance schemes should not replace the current provision 
of support through the CAP. Uncertainty over costs and administrative 
complexity weigh against such a change. Nevertheless, we believe that 
insurance instruments may have a supplementary role to play in helping to 
counter the effects of extreme weather events, for example, and therefore 
should not be ruled out entirely. (Paragraph 190)
19. We recommend that the UK Government give further consideration to the 
use of the mutual fund option within the risk management toolkit available 
under Pillar 2 of the CAP. (Recommendation 5, Paragraph 191)
20. The UK Government has a key role in facilitating the use of financial 
instruments by farmers as the options offered by the EIB need to be 
constructed within the Rural Development Programmes. We recommend 
that the UK Government promote the use of financial instruments and raise 
awareness among farmers with operations of different sizes and in different 
sectors. (Recommendation 6, Paragraph 203)
21. We recommend that the UK Government works with the private sector in 
developing new financial tools which could be accessed under Pillar 2 of the 
CAP. (Recommendation 7, Paragraph 206)
22. We urge the EIB to speed up the work on financial instruments and work 
more closely with Member State governments and agricultural bodies to 
disseminate their work. (Recommendation 8, Paragraph 207)
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23. The success of the Commission’s efforts to promote the use of financial 
instruments will ultimately depend on their inclusion by Member States 
in Rural Development Programmes. It was disappointing that the UK 
Government was unable to provide us with an assurance that they will make 
use of any of the options being developed by the EIB. (Paragraph 208)
24. We recommend that the European Commission and Member State 
governments work proactively with the financial sector to develop and promote 
more accessible and practical risk management tools. (Recommendation 9, 
Paragraph 217)
25. Government policy should ensure that provision is made for training 
and education to farmers in accessing and making use of new financial 
instruments. We encourage bodies who have a role in providing advice to 
famers, such as levy boards, to commit sufficient resources for this task. 
(Recommendation 10, Paragraph 218)
26. Regulatory and implementing technical standards under the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) should not place an unfeasible 
burden on farmers, which might discourage them from using financial risk 
management instruments. (Paragraph 225)
27. We consider that national taxation policies can make a major contribution 
by developing regimes such as sheltered reserves and income averaging. 
The UK Government’s extension of the system of tax averaging for farmers 
announced in the 2015 Budget was a positive development. (Paragraph 229)
28. The funding of agricultural research should be recognised as a priority for 
both the UK Government and the European Commission. We recommend 
that they do much more to promote links between research projects and 
agribusinesses. Joint commitment between the European Commission, 
Member State governments and the private sector will ensure that research 
efforts are focused on the areas of greatest need. (Recommendation 11, 
Paragraph 238)
29. The evidence based approach to policy making must be maintained. 
Agricultural research should inform policy direction at both EU and Member 
State level. Public-private partnerships can assist that research. (Paragraph 
241)
30. The provision of knowledge exchange and training differs across the UK. 
The UK Government should identify examples of best practice of knowledge 
exchange and dissemination wherever it is to be found and actively support 
them. It should also increase its efforts to deliver broadband to ensure 
that farmers in rural areas can access the necessary information online. 
(Recommendation 12, Paragraph 255)
31. Benchmarking in agriculture should be promoted among the farming 
community and encouraged by the UK Government. There is a long 
term business case for equipping farmers in all parts of the UK with the 
knowledge and expertise to calculate and manage their costs of production 
and overheads. Farmers should share their data with their peers to facilitate 
this benchmarking. (Recommendation 13, Paragraph 261)
32. The least supported farming sectors appear to possess better business 
skills. Sectors that have enjoyed historic support now face greater exposure 
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to market forces and should, as a priority, be equipped with the skills to 
improve business knowledge. (Paragraph 262)
33. The CAP’s objectives go beyond the production of agricultural goods. 
They include the provision of public goods, such as land management and 
maintenance of ecosystem services, as well as the mitigation of adverse social 
impacts in rural economies. (Paragraph 270)
34. Given that the agricultural sector is often expected to provide public goods, 
there is a case for financial support in certain circumstances. However, policy 
should display much more explicit links between the expected outcomes and 
the use of public funds. (Paragraph 271)
35. There is a case for public intervention where there is market disruption caused 
by events beyond the control of the industry, such as the recent Russian ban 
on imports from the EU. (Paragraph 273)
36. Given the significant synergies between agricultural and environmental 
policies, they should not be treated as separate policy areas. We urge the UK 
Government to demonstrate that their 25 year plan for food and farming and 
their 25 year plan for the environment are consistent with and support one 
another. (Recommendation 14, Paragraph 275)
37. We recommend that the European Commission consider a restructuring of 
the Common Agricultural Policy primarily to support the provision of public 
goods. (Recommendation 15, Paragraph 281)
38. Market signals are key to encouraging farmers to take the right course of 
action to increase resilience. This will need to be reflected in any future 
policy to ensure that these signals are not removed. (Paragraph 283)
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APPENDIx 2: LIST OF WITNESSES
Evidence is published online at www.parliament.uk/hleud and available for 
inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).
Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order or oral 
evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave 
both oral evidence and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence 
and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written 
evidence only.
Oral evidence in chronological order
** Professor Tim Lloyd QQ 1-11
** Professor Steve McCorriston
** Professor Wyn Morgan
* Country Land and Business Association QQ 12-28
** National Farmers Union
* Professor Paul Wilson
* National Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs
** Tenant Farmers Association
** Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board QQ 29-37
** Menter a Busnes
* Royal Agricultural Society of England
** DG AGRI, European Commission QQ 38-51
* His Excellency Sir Lockwood Smith, High Commissioner 
for New Zealand to the United Kingdom
QQ 52-63
* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
* Barclays Agriculture QQ 64-73
* European Investment Bank
* HSBC Bank Plc
** NFU Mutual
* UK Government QQ 74-87
** Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
* United States Department of Agriculture
Alphabetical list of all witnesses
Agricultural Industries Confederation RPV0023
** Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (QQ 
29-37)
RPV0020
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Agroecology for 
Sustainable Food and Farming
RPV0031
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APPENDIx 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE
The House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee is conducting 
an inquiry into the various responses to price volatility and the potential for 
creating a more resilient agricultural sector. The Sub-Committee seeks evidence 
from anyone with an interest.
Written evidence is sought by 31 December 2015. Evidence sessions will be held in 
December 2015 and January 2016. The Committee aims to report to the House, 
with recommendations, by the end of the Parliamentary Session. The report will 
receive responses from the UK Government and the European Commission, and 
may be debated in the House.
The resilience of the agricultural sector underpins the secure, sustainable and 
affordable supply of food to the citizens of the EU, as well as providing financial 
security for EU farmers. A resilient agricultural sector is one which can respond to 
risk effectively and take steps to mitigate the wider effects of global price volatility.
Effective risk management can mitigate the adverse effects of price volatility. In 
the words of the OECD,
“Risk management in agriculture is now an essential tool for farmers 
to anticipate, avoid and react to shocks. An efficient risk management 
system for agriculture will preserve the standard of living of those 
who depend on farming, strengthen the viability of farm businesses, 
and provide an environment which supports investment in the farming 
sector.”222
The drivers behind price volatility are variable and complex, but a number of 
assumptions can be made: weather-related events will become more frequent 
and more extreme; the global population will rise, leading to an ever increasing 
demand for agricultural products; and the decrease in the availability of land 
and the increased demand for products will drive up the price of agricultural 
commodities.
Public policy at an EU and Member State level has a role in responding to these 
challenges and the ongoing reform of the Common Agricultural Policy should 
provide an opportunity for a co-ordinated approach.
We seek evidence on any aspect of the topic and particularly on the following 
questions:
(1) What is the role of public policy in mitigating the impact of potential price 
volatility? To what extent should the response be a shared endeavour 
between the EU institutions and Member State governments? What are 
the differing roles of industry on the one hand and individual farmers 
on the other?
(2) Should public policy responses make a distinction between support 
for the resilience of the industry as a whole, support for the resilience 
of specific sectors and support for the resilience of individual units of 
activity?
222 OECD, ‘Risk Management in Agriculture: What Role for Governments?’: https://www.oecd.org/
agriculture/agricultural-policies/49003833.pdf [accessed 5 May 2016]
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(3) Currently, what are the key elements involved in the industry’s 
management of price risk? What further tools are needed?
(4) What effect has the commoditisation of agricultural goods had on the 
ability of farmers to respond to risk effectively? How are farmers to 
mitigate the on-farm effects of volatile global commodity markets and 
currency fluctuations?
(5) What are the barriers to more effective on-farm price risk management, 
including longer term pricing mechanisms, diversification, co-operative 
working and leasing? How can those barriers be overcome and what is 
the role of EU and national public policy?
(6) How ‘fit for purpose’ are market-based instruments? Could the 
marketplace help to mitigate risks by providing ways of smoothing 
out the impact of volatility? Are there ways in which EU and national 
public policy could encourage, and reduce the risk of introducing new 
financial products?
(7) How realistic are terms for access to investment finance? What role is 
there for the European Investment Bank to support on-farm investment 
at a low cost? What other instruments could improve access to finance 
in a volatile environment?
(8) What level of information is available to farmers to engage with market-
based instruments and to consider alternative options for on-farm 
actions? How might knowledge availability be improved? How can 
farmers be encouraged to acquire the skills needed to operate a modern 
business-like operation?
(9) What role should innovation play in creating a more resilient agricultural 
sector? Should more be invested in scientific research which could have 
the potential to transform agricultural practices?
(10) How effectively does EU agricultural policy currently assist farmers 
to mitigate the impact of potential price volatility? Is there a need for 
management of price risk to be an explicit objective of the Common 
Agricultural Policy?
(11) What long term changes should be made to the Common Agricultural 
Policy to support the agricultural industry in responding to price risk 
more effectively? Should insurance schemes play a more prominent 
role?
You need not address all these questions in your response.
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